Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 45
pro vyhledávání: '"Ivan Marinovic"'
Autor:
Ivan Marinovic Chaparro
Publikováno v:
ARS Medica, Vol 24, Iss 2 (2018)
Sin resumen
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/8899f9fa62a14119868cb6dc5046cf93
Autor:
Martin Szydlowski, Ivan Marinovic
Publikováno v:
The RAND Journal of Economics. 53:404-428
We provide a novel theory of monitoring. A monitor with career concerns oversees an agent and generates verifiable evidence if the agent shirks. The monitor's ability is uncertain and requires costly investment to maintain. The equilibrium features a
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::09d8ad56d341b4530cf0dd7e09013627
https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12412
https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12412
Publikováno v:
Journal of Financial Economics. 143:227-246
Firm managers likely have more information than outsiders. If managers strategically conceal information, market uncertainty will increase. We develop a dynamic corporate disclosure model, estimating the model using the management earnings forecasts
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::4c1adf9de1bb4805488bb2666bcee700
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2021.05.025
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2021.05.025
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::c8e75ac1fe57e214dd622cd54bb12231
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4336916
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4336916
Publikováno v:
Management Science. 67:2541-2561
We study the consequences of misreporting in settings where ambiguity-averse investors face uncertainty about two aspects of the firm: its productivity and the weakness of its reporting system. We show that the joint presence of these two sources of
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::9e4537fc14e0f81c91e6a5f92bbe5fe4
https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2019.3558
https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2019.3558
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::03ee53995e956d2eee9da3b420bd8467
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4011359
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4011359
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::31be4d9da166cb1f105946211be7d7a5
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4291189
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4291189
Publikováno v:
The Accounting Review. 95:73-102
We estimate and test a model of voluntary disclosure in which a manager’s information set is uncertain (Dye 1985; Jung and Kwon 1988). In this model, a manager makes his disclosure decision to maximize the market price, but sometimes, for exogenous
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::46ea8a45ac1a34870e8467d783e80ddf
https://doi.org/10.2308/accr-52619
https://doi.org/10.2308/accr-52619
Autor:
Ivan Marinovic, Felipe Varas
Publikováno v:
The Journal of Finance. 74:2011-2053
This paper studies optimal contracts when managers manipulate their performance measure at the expense of firm value. Optimal contracts defer compensation. The manager's incentives vest over time at an increasing rate, and compensation becomes very s
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::32c870816b076a37b7474a31a05e31b4
https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.12770
https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.12770
Autor:
Ivan Marinovic
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::e7c24ef862f760a7e88e1fcf409fc4c1
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3949759
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3949759