Threshold of preference for collusion and interconnection fees in different market structures: the Tunisian mobile market case

Autor: Walid Hichri, Sami Debbichi

Publikováno v: International Journal of Collaborative Enterprise
International Journal of Collaborative Enterprise, Inderscience Publishers, 2018, 6 (1), pp. 66-85
International Journal of Collaborative Enterprise, 2018, 6 (1), pp. 66-85

We present a Cournot model that compares the critical threshold of collusion in Duopoly and Oligopoly Markets where the actors are private, mixed or public. We assume that the incentive critical threshold for collusion depends on the interconnection

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::0e26b49d12e96d38bb9475185840a033
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01947733