Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 33
pro vyhledávání: '"Ingolf Dittmann"'
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::9aff239e2b11ac26e04eb0785e2bd155
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4084794
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4084794
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::d3f09724c0886633484f7b181046dcf6
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4004098
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4004098
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
This paper shows evidence for the hypothesis that the CEO opportunistically times share repurchases around her grants of at-the-money stock options. We find that firms decrease their repurchase activity in the quarter before the stock option grant to
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::e182bb008c8826047bc2dc0a9b38a074
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3316793
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3316793
Autor:
Ingolf Dittmann
Publikováno v:
Illicit Activity ISBN: 9781315185194
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::03105c3a29ef6aa818e2af81a8ed3ca8
https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315185194-7
https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315185194-7
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
textabstractIs the difference in compensation between managers and workers related to the quality of the firm? We propose an asset pricing model with unsophisticated traders and short-sales constraints, in which the optimal wage gap increases with ma
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::40c2d55c114c2b42a9a61dd282ac108e
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3226225
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3226225
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Do employees who compare themselves to the CEO matter for executive compensation? We hypothesize that employees have relative wealth concerns and compare their wage to the CEO's pay. Using German establishment-level wage data, we indeed show that emp
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::2841cc09d12599c244b919c03dae6050
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3160228
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3160228
Publikováno v:
Review of Finance
Review of Finance, 21(5), 1805-1846. Oxford University Press
Review of Finance, 21(5), 1805-1846. Oxford University Press
As the lead article in this issue the article is made free of charge on the OUP website, even to non-subscribers. https://academic.oup.com/rof We consider a model in which shareholders provide a risk-averse CEO with risk-taking incentives in addition
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::1d5f476d65b4c5f37bb7a7915f3c6ad1
http://hdl.handle.net/11250/2461164
http://hdl.handle.net/11250/2461164
Publikováno v:
Games and Economic Behavior. 84:17-38
We perform an experiment in which subjects bid for participating in a vote. The setting precludes conflicts of interests or direct benefits from voting. The theoretical value of participating in the vote is therefore zero if subjects have only instru
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::e53a8e86b6cdf878a86e0f70b0faddbd
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.12.004
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.12.004
Publikováno v:
Journal of Corporate Finance, 17(4), 1200-1220. Elsevier
We analyze several proposals to restrict CEO compensation and calibrate two models of executive compensation that describe how firms would react to different types of restrictions. We find that many restrictions would have unintended consequences. Re
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::7576290e222951d2fca0ccf856da5a4b
https://hdl.handle.net/1765/23950
https://hdl.handle.net/1765/23950
Autor:
Ingolf Dittmann
Publikováno v:
Review of Accounting Studies, 15(3), 578-583. Springer New York
This discussion provides several explanations for the evidence presented in Balachandran and Mohanram (2010) that are consistent with efficient contracting. I also show that—contrary to the suggestion of the title—CEOs do not benefit from value d
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::bef72a915e3ff284a8ae8bc66c9f2fcf
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11142-010-9125-4
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11142-010-9125-4