Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 53
pro vyhledávání: '"Imperfect public monitoring"'
Autor:
Kandori, Michihiro, Obara, Ichiro
Publikováno v:
Econometrica, 2006 Mar 01. 74(2), 499-519.
Externí odkaz:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/3598808
This paper shows the existence of a sorry equilibrium in a game of imperfect public monitoring. In equilibrium, a self-imposed costly apology tendered after an accidental defection, makes private information public, allowing for continued cooperation
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dris___01181::3790ff654321b829949e85532db622e7
https://research.tilburguniversity.edu/en/publications/5925920e-05c6-4ae0-8e76-d7dc5cc314a6
https://research.tilburguniversity.edu/en/publications/5925920e-05c6-4ae0-8e76-d7dc5cc314a6
Autor:
Srivastava, Vatsalya
This paper shows the existence of a sorry equilibrium in a game of imperfect public monitoring. In equilibrium, a self-imposed costly apology tendered after an accidental defection, makes private information public, allowing for continued cooperation
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=narcis______::67b548beb98c5cfe9ddb699e6c2f4af7
https://research.tilburguniversity.edu/en/publications/252e9410-4c9f-4a40-9ab7-a8a501788803
https://research.tilburguniversity.edu/en/publications/252e9410-4c9f-4a40-9ab7-a8a501788803
This paper shows the existence of a sorry equilibrium in a game of imperfect public monitoring. In equilibrium, a self-imposed costly apology tendered after an accidental defection, makes private information public, allowing for continued cooperation
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dris___00893::6138200de67cac9a5723307b33d54d8c
This paper shows the existence of a sorry equilibrium in a game of imperfect public monitoring. In equilibrium, a self-imposed costly apology tendered after an accidental defection, makes private information public, allowing for continued cooperation
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dris___00893::5fb8c9e4cf8cbb60eeba007922f1a524
This paper shows the existence of a sorry equilibrium in a game of imperfect public monitoring. In equilibrium, a self-imposed costly apology tendered after an accidental defection, makes private information public, allowing for continued cooperation
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dris___01181::04c0a570cecd0365d8c065dceed7e762
https://research.tilburguniversity.edu/en/publications/252e9410-4c9f-4a40-9ab7-a8a501788803
https://research.tilburguniversity.edu/en/publications/252e9410-4c9f-4a40-9ab7-a8a501788803
Autor:
Srivastava, Vatsalya
This paper shows the existence of a sorry equilibrium in a game of imperfect public monitoring. In equilibrium, a self-imposed costly apology tendered after an accidental defection, makes private information public, allowing for continued cooperation
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=narcis______::ceb0af8037b9ebffeb7a4852129eaaf8
https://research.tilburguniversity.edu/en/publications/5925920e-05c6-4ae0-8e76-d7dc5cc314a6
https://research.tilburguniversity.edu/en/publications/5925920e-05c6-4ae0-8e76-d7dc5cc314a6
We explore in an experiment what leads to the breakdown of partnerships. Subjects are assigned a partner and participate in a repeated public good game with stochastic outcomes. They can choose each period between staying in the public project or wor
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::29199f8da00d2dc8eb36508926fff49f
http://pubdb.wiwi.uni-jena.de/pdf/wp_2014_012.pdf
http://pubdb.wiwi.uni-jena.de/pdf/wp_2014_012.pdf
Autor:
Laclau, Marie, Tomala, Tristan
We consider repeated games with compact actions sets and pure strategies in which players commonly observe a public signal which reveals imperfectly the action profile. We characterize the set of payoffs profiles that can be sustained by a perfect eq
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dedup_wf_001::7b6045ab65b942637b20a3490c81f28a
https://hal-pse.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01285326/document
https://hal-pse.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01285326/document
When players face uncertainty in choosing actions, undesirable outcomes cannot be avoided. Accidental defections caused by uncertainty, that does not depend on the level of care, require a mechanism to reconcile the players. This paper shows the exis
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dris___00893::3f788b81765b09541394d5245c765d19