Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 18
pro vyhledávání: '"Ilan Guttman"'
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::d103a1c5fc103cda675d2fe815615cd3
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4325834
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4325834
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::03ee53995e956d2eee9da3b420bd8467
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4011359
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4011359
Autor:
Cyrus Aghamolla, Ilan Guttman
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
We study a dynamic timing game between multiple firms, who decide when to go public in the presence of possible information externalities. A firm's IPO pricing is a function of its privately observed idiosyncratic type and the level of investor senti
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::d9b23f518969852270fc5abb252fabca
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3717140
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3717140
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Firms with correlated fundamentals often issue reports sequentially, leading to information spillovers. The theoretical literature has investigated multi-firm reporting, but only when firms report simultaneously. We examine the implications of sequen
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::db9b2fdd90d53ba1451ed83463acaad3
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3741646
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3741646
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
We analyze a model in which information may be voluntarily disclosed by a firm and/or by a third party, e.g., financial analysts. Due to its strategic nature, corporate voluntary disclosure is qualitatively different from third-party disclosure. Grea
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::66fd5e49fad0909b99492853a6306639
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3211173
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3211173
Autor:
Xiaojing Meng, Ilan Guttman
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Firms' ability to voluntarily disclose or conceal information may affect their investment decisions. In particular, voluntary disclosure in the presence of uncertainty about information endowment (a la Dye 1985) induces firms to choose the riskier am
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::710e91208b2935c4070a4ad17278d8f8
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3303486
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3303486
Publikováno v:
Journal of Accounting Research. 52:817-847
We study optimal compensation contracts that (1) are designed to address a joint moral hazard and adverse selection problem and that (2) are based on performance measures, which may be manipulated by the agent at a cost. In the model, a manager is pr
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::ae062cbf7c6888b8959e5c53ff64e261
https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.12058
https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.12058
Autor:
Ilan Guttman
Publikováno v:
Journal of Accounting Research. 51:335-347
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::25c8a426bcfe68135a6d145826fe9f65
https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.12014
https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.12014
Autor:
Ivan Marinovic, Ilan Guttman
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Empirical evidence suggests that firms often manipulate reported numbers to avoid debt covenant violations. We study how a firm’s ability to manipulate reports affects the terms of its debt contracts and the resulting investment and manipulation de
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::86414a5a4467b9dddb9c9aff038e5847
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2902942
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2902942
Autor:
Anne Beyer, Ilan Guttman
Publikováno v:
The Accounting Review. 86:451-481
This study models the interaction between a sell-side analyst and risk-averse investors. It derives an analyst’s optimal earnings forecast and investors’ optimal trading decisions in a setting where the analyst’s payoff depends on the trading v
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::a09021417c42188fe0c9dcdad2db641e
https://doi.org/10.2308/accr.00000030
https://doi.org/10.2308/accr.00000030