Zobrazeno 1 - 9
of 9
pro vyhledávání: '"Ignacio Monzón"'
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Theory. 204:105500
Autor:
Ignacio Monzón
Publikováno v:
Theoretical Economics. 14:403-435
I present a model of observational learning with payoff interdependence. Agents, ordered in a sequence, receive private signals about an uncertain state of the world and sample previous actions. Unlike in standard models of observational learning, an
Autor:
Ignacio Monzón, Andrea Gallice
We present a natural environment that sustains full co-operation in one-shot social dilemmas among a finite number of self-interested agents. Players sequentially decide whether to contribute to a public good. They do not know their position in the s
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::1f37664f7b381e618e541e51433203e4
http://hdl.handle.net/2318/1638538
http://hdl.handle.net/2318/1638538
Autor:
Cristian Bartolucci, Ignacio Monzón
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
We present a partnership model where heterogeneous agents bargain over the gains from trade and search on the match. Frictions allow agents to extract higher rents from more productive partners, generating an endogenous preference for high types. Mor
Autor:
Andrea Gallice, Ignacio Monzón
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
We present a natural environment that sustains full cooperation in one-shot social dilemmas among a finite number of self-interested agents. Players sequentially decide whether to contribute to a public good. They do not know their position in the se
Autor:
Ignacio Monzón
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
A continuum of homogeneous rational agents choose between two competing technologies. Agents observe a private signal and sample others' previous choices. Signals have an aggregate component of uncertainty, so aggregate behavior does not necessarily
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
We propose a novel methodology to uncover the sorting pattern in labor markets. We identify the strength of sorting solely from a ranking of firms by profits. To discern the sign of sorting, we build a noisy ranking of workers from wage data. Our tes
Autor:
Michael Rapp, Ignacio Monzón
Observational learning is typically examined when agents have precise information about their position in the sequence of play. We present a model in which agents are uncertain about their positions. Agents are allowed to have arbitrary ex-ante belie
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::52dd0740440ec755799cded7e4c221fe
http://hdl.handle.net/2318/1768197
http://hdl.handle.net/2318/1768197
Autor:
Ignacio Monzón
This paper presents a model in which homogeneous rational agents choose between two competing technologies. Agents observe a private signal and a sample of other agents’ previous choices. The signal has both an idiosyncratic and an aggregate compon
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od_______645::ef9ad986e9caf9f23284f9a4b1d1d62d
http://www.carloalberto.org/assets/working-papers/no.245.pdf
http://www.carloalberto.org/assets/working-papers/no.245.pdf