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pro vyhledávání: '"Ian Rumfitt"'
Autor:
Ian Rumfitt
I advance arguments in favour of PKF as an articulation of a central sense of the predicate ‘true’, and show how it illuminates the relationship between that sense and the ‘external’ notion of truth found in such claims as ‘An utterance of
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::2567ce71346497e623d9d08830ef0222
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-04009-x
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-04009-x
Autor:
Ian Rumfitt
Publikováno v:
Mind. 131:1027-1038
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::d7140916fec2bc85a6771b6c8e43d952
https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzab019
https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzab019
Autor:
Ian Rumfitt
Publikováno v:
Philosophy. 94:513-528
I compare three sorts of case in which philosophers have argued that we cannot assert the Law of Excluded Middle for statements of identity. Adherents of Smooth Infinitesimal Analysis deny that Excluded Middle holds for statements saying that an infi
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::cc6d3d7f51d1f137dae599c5b338582e
https://doi.org/10.1017/s003181911900010x
https://doi.org/10.1017/s003181911900010x
Autor:
Ian Rumfitt
Publikováno v:
Logic, Language, and Mathematics ISBN: 0199278342
This chapter considers the question: should we employ intuitionistic logic, not classical logic, when reasoning with vague concepts? In his commentary on Michael Dummett’s “Wang’s Paradox,” Crispin Wright presents an apparently powerful argum
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::4770cfaa71715928ab1a54c61244d8c5
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199278343.003.0006
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199278343.003.0006
Autor:
Ian Rumfitt
Publikováno v:
Philosophical Studies. 175:2091-2103
I am very grateful to Crispin Wright and Richard Zach for their thoughtful and penetrating comments on my book, The Boundary Stones of Thought (henceforth BST; unadorned page numbers below refer to this volume). The author of any reasonably long phil
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::a9fd393e75d7c24e7e510085f9dbb131
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1115-6
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1115-6
Autor:
Ian Rumfitt
Publikováno v:
Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Language Volume 1 ISBN: 0198836562
P. F. Strawson explained truth, as it applies to statements, by saying: ‘one who makes a statement or assertion makes a true statement if and only if things are as, in making the statement, he states them to be’. This explanation differs from oth
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::d160896597a85305f1d34826c6da408f
https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:49171b32-bec4-4f03-a015-d6bc46258c20
https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:49171b32-bec4-4f03-a015-d6bc46258c20
Autor:
Ian Rumfitt
Publikováno v:
Oxford Scholarship
This chapter considers what form a neo-Fregean account of ordinal numbers might take. It begins by discussing how the natural abstraction principle for ordinals yields a contradiction (the Burali-Forti Paradox) when combined with impredicative second
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::d0d3f0c8a8f67d855e9e779aa1299dab
https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:50783c04-6653-4637-92d4-c30bdbed2e08
https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:50783c04-6653-4637-92d4-c30bdbed2e08
Autor:
Ian Rumfitt, Bradley Armour-Garb
Liar sentences say nothing, according to this chapter—which, it claims, we can, in effect, prove. But extending the proof as the chapter does appears to result in revenge. The solution to this problem is to restrict the laws of logic by distinguish
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::2fd576937f29e735ec64fcd48a7317fb
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199896042.003.0008
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199896042.003.0008
Autor:
Ian Rumfitt, Susanne Bobzien
Intuitionistic logic provides an elegant solution to the Sorites Paradox. Its acceptance has been hampered by two factors. First, the lack of an accepted semantics for languages containing vague terms has led even philosophers sympathetic to intuitio
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::f77c71d435c903afb8c35f99493b5017
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-019-09507-x
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-019-09507-x
Autor:
Ian Rumfitt
In reply to Linnebo, I defend my analysis of Tait's argument against the use of classical logic in set theory, and make some preliminary comments on Linnebo's new argument for the same conclusion. I then turn to Shapiro's discussion of intuitionistic
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::a0f1a3a0a1e49e3009fe8c69976f4add
https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2018.1530829
https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2018.1530829