Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 220
pro vyhledávání: '"IMMORLICA, NICOLE"'
Traditionally, AI has been modeled within economics as a technology that impacts payoffs by reducing costs or refining information for human agents. Our position is that, in light of recent advances in generative AI, it is increasingly useful to mode
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2406.00477
We study the problem of a principal who wants to influence an agent's observable action, subject to an ex-post budget. The agent has a private type determining their cost function. This paper endogenizes the value of the resource driving incentives,
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2404.15531
We introduce a model of online algorithms subject to strict constraints on data retention. An online learning algorithm encounters a stream of data points, one per round, generated by some stationary process. Crucially, each data point can request th
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2404.10997
When deployed in the world, a learning agent such as a recommender system or a chatbot often repeatedly interacts with another learning agent (such as a user) over time. In many such two-agent systems, each agent learns separately and the rewards of
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2403.00188
We study a Bayesian persuasion game where a sender wants to persuade a receiver to take a binary action, such as purchasing a product. The sender is informed about the (binary) state of the world, such as whether the quality of the product is high or
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2311.18138
Motivated by applications such as voluntary carbon markets and educational testing, we consider a market for goods with varying but hidden levels of quality in the presence of a third-party certifier. The certifier can provide informative signals abo
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2301.13449
Autor:
Eguia, Jon X., Immorlica, Nicole, Lalley, Steven P., Ligett, Katrina, Weyl, Glen, Xefteris, Dimitrios
Consider the following collective choice problem: a group of budget constrained agents must choose one of several alternatives. Is there a budget balanced mechanism that: i) does not depend on the specific characteristics of the group, ii) does not r
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2301.06206
Autor:
Ball, Ian, Bono, James, Grana, Justin, Immorlica, Nicole, Lucier, Brendan, Slivkins, Aleksandrs
We develop a model of content filtering as a game between the filter and the content consumer, where the latter incurs information costs for examining the content. Motivating examples include censoring misinformation, spam/phish filtering, and recomm
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2205.14060
The tendency for individuals to form social ties with others who are similar to themselves, known as homophily, is one of the most robust sociological principles. Since this phenomenon can lead to patterns of interactions that segregate people along
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2205.13658
We study a communication game between a sender and a receiver. The sender chooses one of her signals about the state of the world (i.e., anecdotes) and communicates to the receiver who takes an action affecting both players. The sender and the receiv
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2205.13461