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pro vyhledávání: '"I. G. Sarma"'
Autor:
I. G. Sarma, C. Jayaraj
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Control. 11:489-497
When a compatible dynamical observer is employod to construct the estimates of the inaccessible states of the system, an increase in the value of the performance index of a finite-time optimal regulator is in general encountered. An expression for th
Autor:
Rammohan K. Ragade, I. G. Sarma
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Control. 10:331-335
This note examines the notions of controllability, observability and sufficient coordinates in linear differential games as applicable to a ‘ playable ’ pair of strategics.
Autor:
I. G. Sarma, U. R. Prasad
Publikováno v:
Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications. 10:160-177
Autor:
Rammohan K. Ragade, I. G. Sarma
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Control. 4:265-279
The theory of differential games is of recent origin. In attempting to formulate optimal control problems with uncertainty as differential games, several difficulties which are characteristic of differential game theory are encountered. The nature of
Necessary Conditions for Optimal Strategies in a Class of Noncooperative N-Person Differential Games
Publikováno v:
SIAM Journal on Control. 7:637-644
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Control. 9:291-310
In this paper time-domain models for sensitivity analyses of linear systems have been developed. The procedures for developing those models are quite similar to the formulation of state models which are based on graph-theoretic concepts. Sensitivity
Autor:
I. G. Sarma, U. R. Prasad
Publikováno v:
SIAM Journal on Control. 9:441-445
In this note, we show that the main results of our previous paper [1], the properties of the value function vector and the equilibrium point principle stated in Theorems 1 and 2 of [1], are extendable to a slightly larger but considerably more realis
Autor:
I. G. Sarma, U. R. Prasad
Publikováno v:
Multicriteria Decision Making and Differential Games ISBN: 9781461587705
Switching surfaces in N-person differential games are essentially similar to those encountered in optimal control and two-person, zero-sum differential games. The differences between the Nash noncooperative solution and the saddle-point solution are
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::a7781c42e89f733d321ca8c6732d228d
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-8768-2_11
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-8768-2_11
Autor:
I. G. Sarma, S. Vathsal
Publikováno v:
IndraStra Global.
By deriving the equations for an error analysis of modeling inaccuracies for the combined estimation and control problem, it is shown that the optimum estimation error is orthogonal to the actual suboptimum estimate.