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of 32
pro vyhledávání: '"Hoy, Darrell"'
Equilibria in auctions can be very difficult to analyze, beyond the symmetric environments where revenue equivalence renders the analysis straightforward. This paper takes a robust approach to evaluating the equilibria of auctions. Rather than identi
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2310.03702
Autor:
Cramton, Peter, Bohlin, Erik, Brandkamp, Simon, Dark, Jason, Hoy, Darrell, Kyle, Albert S., Malec, David, Ockenfels, Axel, Wilkens, Chris
Publikováno v:
In Telecommunications Policy October 2024 48(9)
This paper proves that the welfare of the first price auction in Bayes-Nash equilibrium is at least a $.743$-fraction of the welfare of the optimal mechanism assuming agents' values are independently distributed. The previous best bound was $1-1/e \a
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1803.06707
In Amazon EC2, cloud resources are sold through a combination of an on-demand market, in which customers buy resources at a fixed price, and a spot market, in which customers bid for an uncertain supply of excess resources. Standard market environmen
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1612.06347
Analysis of efficiency of outcomes in game theoretic settings has been a main item of study at the intersection of economics and computer science. The notion of the price of anarchy takes a worst-case stance to efficiency analysis, considering instan
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1505.00437
This paper develops tools for welfare and revenue analyses of Bayes-Nash equilibria in asymmetric auctions with single-dimensional agents. We employ these tools to derive price of anarchy results for social welfare and revenue. Our approach separates
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1404.5943
The first-price auction is popular in practice for its simplicity and transparency. Moreover, its potential virtues grow in complex settings where incentive compatible auctions may generate little or no revenue. Unfortunately, the first-price auction
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1304.7718
We study simple and approximately optimal auctions for agents with a particular form of risk-averse preferences. We show that, for symmetric agents, the optimal revenue (given a prior distribution over the agent preferences) can be approximated by th
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1301.0401
A single advertisement often benefits many parties, for example, an ad for a Samsung laptop benefits Microsoft. We study this phenomenon in search advertising auctions and show that standard solutions, including the status quo ignorance of mutual ben
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1209.0832
Publikováno v:
Mathematics of Operations Research, 2015 Aug 01. 40(3), 634-654.
Externí odkaz:
http://www.jstor.org/stable/24540968