Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 82
pro vyhledávání: '"Hollender, Alexandros"'
Autor:
Ghosh, Abheek, Hollender, Alexandros
We study symmetric bimatrix games that also have the common-payoff property, i.e., the two players receive the same payoff at any outcome of the game. Due to the symmetry property, these games are guaranteed to have symmetric Nash equilibria, where t
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2410.08031
Adversarial multiplayer games are an important object of study in multiagent learning. In particular, polymatrix zero-sum games are a multiplayer setting where Nash equilibria are known to be efficiently computable. Towards understanding the limits o
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2409.07398
Autor:
Göös, Mika1 (AUTHOR) mika.goos@epfl.ch, Hollender, Alexandros2 (AUTHOR) alexandros.hollender@cs.ox.ac.uk, Jain, Siddhartha3 (AUTHOR) sidjain@cs.utexas.edu, Maystre, Gilbert1 (AUTHOR) gilbert.maystre@epfl.ch, Pires, William4 (AUTHOR) wp2294@columbia.edu, Robere, Robert5 (AUTHOR) robere@cs.mcgill.ca, Tao, Ran6 (AUTHOR) rant2@andrew.cmu.edu
Publikováno v:
Journal of the ACM. Aug2024, Vol. 71 Issue 4, p1-45. 45p.
Autor:
Dinh, Jérémi Do, Hollender, Alexandros
Publikováno v:
Information Processing Letters, 186:Article 106486 (2024)
We study public goods games, a type of game where every player has to decide whether or not to produce a good which is public, i.e., neighboring players can also benefit from it. Specifically, we consider a setting where the good is indivisible and w
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2402.14198
We study the computational complexity of computing Bayes-Nash equilibria in first-price auctions with discrete value distributions and discrete bidding space, under general subjective beliefs. It is known that such auctions do not always have pure eq
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2402.12068
We introduce a general technique for proving membership of search problems with exact rational solutions in PPAD, one of the most well-known classes containing total search problems with polynomial-time verifiable solutions. In particular, we constru
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2312.01237
It is well known that solving a (non-convex) quadratic program is NP-hard. We show that the problem remains hard even if we are only looking for a Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) point, instead of a global optimum. Namely, we prove that computing a KKT poin
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2311.13738
In the envy-free cake-cutting problem we are given a resource, usually called a cake and represented as the $[0,1]$ interval, and a set of $n$ agents with heterogeneous preferences over pieces of the cake. The goal is to divide the cake among the $n$
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2311.02075
Finding approximate stationary points, i.e., points where the gradient is approximately zero, of non-convex but smooth objective functions $f$ over unrestricted $d$-dimensional domains is one of the most fundamental problems in classical non-convex o
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2310.09157
Given a function f: [a,b] -> R, if f(a) < 0 and f(b)> 0 and f is continuous, the Intermediate Value Theorem implies that f has a root in [a,b]. Moreover, given a value-oracle for f, an approximate root of f can be computed using the bisection method,
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2310.07333