Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 96
pro vyhledávání: '"Henk Norde"'
Publikováno v:
Annals of Operations Research. 318:963-983
A weighted minimum colouring (WMC) game is induced by an undirected graph and a positive weight vector on its vertices. The value of a coalition in a WMC game is determined by the weighted chromatic number of its induced subgraph. A graph G is said t
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::4a022cb05021ac1cdf883d3114937d38
https://research.tilburguniversity.edu/en/publications/ee84d5e4-08d7-4154-9521-2e5e9b67d27c
https://research.tilburguniversity.edu/en/publications/ee84d5e4-08d7-4154-9521-2e5e9b67d27c
Autor:
Stefano Moretti, Henk Norde
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Game Theory, 51, 87-118. Springer Verlag
International Journal of Game Theory
International Journal of Game Theory, Springer Verlag, 2021, ⟨10.1007/s00182-021-00786-w⟩
International Journal of Game Theory
International Journal of Game Theory, Springer Verlag, 2021, ⟨10.1007/s00182-021-00786-w⟩
A Generalized Additive Game (GAG) (Cesari et al. in Int J Game Theory 46(4):919–939, 2017) is a Transferable Utility (TU) game (N, v), where each player in N is provided with an individual value, and the worth v(S) of a coalition $$S \subseteq N$$
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::8f586697c8822b562ca62bccea4cec06
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-021-00786-w
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-021-00786-w
Autor:
Stefano Moretti, Henk Norde
Publikováno v:
Social Choice and Welfare
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer Verlag, 2021, 57, pp.721-732. ⟨10.1007/s00355-021-01337-8⟩
Social Choice and Welfare, 57(4), 721-732. Springer New York
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer Verlag, 2021, 57, pp.721-732. ⟨10.1007/s00355-021-01337-8⟩
Social Choice and Welfare, 57(4), 721-732. Springer New York
In this note we consider the class of weighted multi-glove games. We will show that these games are totally balanced and we will characterize the weighted multi-glove games that are supermodular and pmas-admissible. Moreover, we will provide an expli
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::6bb6bae281f49a782b55b494efeb82de
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-021-01337-8
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-021-01337-8
Publikováno v:
European Journal of Operational Research, 282(1), 277-287. Elsevier Science BV
European Journal of Operational Research, 282(1), 277-287. Elsevier
European Journal of Operational Research, 282(1), 277-287. Elsevier
This paper analyzes risk capital allocation problems. For risk capital allocation problems, the aim is to allocate the risk capital of a firm to its divisions. Risk capital allocation is of central importance in risk-based performance measurement. We
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::2b6af5409b0e2458fa0432377a12322e
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2019.09.022
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2019.09.022
Publikováno v:
Insurance: Mathematics & Economics, 72, 175-188. Elsevier
Insurance: Mathematics & Economics, 72, 175-188. Elsevier Science BV
Insurance: Mathematics & Economics, 72, 175-188. Elsevier Science BV
Existing literature regarding the natural hedge potential that arises from combining different longevity linked liabilities typically does not address the question how changes in the liability mix can be obtained. We consider firms who aim to exploit
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::6a17f53717aa7662c111d73564812edf
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.insmatheco.2016.11.004
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.insmatheco.2016.11.004
Publikováno v:
Mathematical Programming, 145(1-2), 509-529. Springer
For the class of minimum coloring games (introduced by Deng et al. Math Oper Res, 24:751---766, 1999) we investigate the existence of population monotonic allocation schemes (introduced by Sprumont Games Econ Behav 2:378---394, 1990). We show that a
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::aa113668555b1a11ed860fb03f56daec
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-013-0655-y
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-013-0655-y
Publikováno v:
European Journal of Operational Research, 253(2), 441-455. Elsevier Science BV
European Journal of Operational Research, 253(2), 441-455. Elsevier
European Journal of Operational Research, 253(2), 441-455. Elsevier
Due to copyright restrictions, the access to the full text of this article is only available via subscription. We study incentive issues seen in a firm performing global planning and manufacturing, and local demand management. The stochastic demands
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::388d4f23cc035d6acb7c0571722ea87a
https://research.tilburguniversity.edu/en/publications/609e0635-7300-45a5-bc6c-375ffe6dc29f
https://research.tilburguniversity.edu/en/publications/609e0635-7300-45a5-bc6c-375ffe6dc29f
Autor:
Gerwald van Gulick, Henk Norde
Publikováno v:
Mathematical Methods of Operations Research. 77:131-146
We study the relation between the fuzzy core and balancedness for fuzzy games. For regular games, this relation has been studied by Bondareva (Problemy Kibernet 10:119–139, 1963) and Shapley (Naval Res Logist Q 14: 453–460, 1967). First, we gain
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::22d922e0e125e7423d70b8230f5e46bc
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00186-012-0417-2
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00186-012-0417-2
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Production Economics, 133(1), 35-42. Elsevier Science BV
International Journal of Production Economics, 133(1), 35-42. Elsevier
International Journal of Production Economics, 133(1), 35-42. Elsevier
This study considers a simple newsvendor situation that consists of n retailers, all selling the same item with common purchasing costs and common selling prices. Groups of retailers might increase their expected joint profit by inventory centralizat
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::cb55ac486873ad4ce85d915203013734
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpe.2010.01.022
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpe.2010.01.022
Autor:
Henk Norde, Marco Slikker
Publikováno v:
Tilburg University-PURE
Games and Economic Behavior, 71(2), 420-435. Academic Press Inc.
Games and Economic Behavior, 71(2), 420-435. Academic Press Inc.
The analysis of single-valued solution concepts for coalitional games with transferable utilities has a long tradition. Opposed to most of this literature we will not deal with solution concepts that provide payoffs to the players for the grand coali
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::ec9522e0919c0b03190251043c8fc6ae
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.04.008
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.04.008