Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 21
pro vyhledávání: '"Heikki Rantakari"'
Autor:
Ricardo Alonso, Heikki Rantakari
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 195:257-271
We analyze a class of sender-receiver games with quadratic payoffs, which includes the communication games in Alonso et al. (2008) and Rantakari (2008) as special cases, for which the sender's or the receiver's maximum expected payoff when players ha
Autor:
Heikki Rantakari
Publikováno v:
Journal of the European Economic Association. 19:1116-1161
Agents need to be motivated to develop ideas and to share information regarding their potential value. When the agents fail to agree on which alternative to implement, the principal needs to decide how to resolve the disagreement. When the agents’
Autor:
Heikki Rantakari
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Autor:
Heikki Rantakari
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Autor:
Heikki Rantakari
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Autor:
Heikki Rantakari
Publikováno v:
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. 32:719-761
An uninformed principal elicits recommendations from privately informed agents regarding the quality of their projects, and may then further investigate the proposals. Although valuable by itself, the principal’s ability to acquire further informat
Publikováno v:
Games and Economic Behavior. 96:65-89
We study a competitive cheap talk model with two senders. Each sender is responsible for a single project and observes its return. Exactly one project will be implemented. Both senders share some common interests with the principal, but have own-proj
Autor:
Heikki Rantakari, Desmond Lo
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
To generate downstream sales, manufacturers often spend both effort and compensation when working with their dealers. Existing theories are inconclusive about the interdependent role of the two kinds of instruments in motivating dealer effort; that i
Autor:
Heikki Rantakari
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 102:14-42
I analyze a problem of project selection where two agents, privately informed of both the true value and their bias in favor of their alternatives, make non-verifiable proposals to an uninformed decision-maker. The analysis makes two contributions. F
Autor:
Heikki Rantakari
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.