Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 34
pro vyhledávání: '"Hector Chade"'
Autor:
Hector Chade, Ilse Lindenlaub
Publikováno v:
The Review of Economic Studies. 89:626-665
We develop a model where risk-averse workers can costly invest in their skills before matching with heterogenous firms. At the investment stage, workers face multiple sources of risk. They are uncertain about how skilled they will turn out and also a
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::ff6a65f5af1819cbccf9040a91988802
https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdab033
https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdab033
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::1f015af0b6e614605a690cb743883081
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4243172
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4243172
Autor:
Hector Chade, Jan Eeckhout
Publikováno v:
The Review of Economic Studies. 87:1134-1173
In many economic applications of matching, the teams that form compete later in market structures with strategic interactions or with knowledge spillovers. Such post-match competition introduces externalities at the matching stage: a team’s payoff
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::89549ab2545a0f19f957f0169d3ff331
https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdz022
https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdz022
Autor:
Jeroen M. Swinkels, Hector Chade
We define and explore no‐upward‐crossing (NUC), a condition satisfied by every parameterized family of distributions commonly used in economic applications. Under smoothness assumptions, NUC is equivalent to log‐supermodularity of the negative
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::536e76fae724f7fb2832e8e5e72ff4f5
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/253448
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/253448
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Literature. 55:493-544
Toward understanding assortative matching, this is a self-contained introduction to research on search and matching. We first explore the nontransferable and perfectly transferable utility matching paradigms, and then a unifying imperfectly transfera
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::81f2cefd0698e48a5e262a9b450e6cd7
https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.20150777
https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.20150777
Autor:
Natalia Kovrijnykh, Hector Chade
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Theory. 162:55-92
We analyze a principal–agent problem with moral hazard where a principal searches for an opportunity of uncertain return, and hires an agent to evaluate available options. The agent's effort affects the informativeness of a signal about an option's
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::74502c7714762ec9b2d4a70c7a2059e8
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.12.003
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.12.003
Autor:
Hector Chade, Edward E. Schlee
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Theory. 189:105085
The standard monopoly insurance model with adverse selection implies that there are always gains to trade, that only the best (unobservable) risks can go uninsured, and that a profit-maximizing menu cannot pool all types. We show that insurance-provi
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::dc1f79afe2ee097ab6ffc080345ffca6
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105085
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105085
Autor:
Jeroen M. Swinkels, Hector Chade
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Theory. 187:105032
We study the moral-hazard problem when the agent's reservation utility is large, but so is the agent's value to the principal. We show that the principal's cost of implementing effort has a very simple limiting form. For large enough outside option,
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::6764dd0a1b6fc18ff7d15b1f1d17b7c2
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105032
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105032
Publikováno v:
Games and Economic Behavior. 86:1-11
We analyze how the agent's initial wealth affects the principal's expected profits in the standard principal–agent model with moral hazard. We show that if the principal prefers a poorer agent for all specifications of action sets, probability dist
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::3a023ea2947a715af5248baeb7e47a45
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.02.012
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.02.012