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of 41
pro vyhledávání: '"Heather Dyke"'
Autor:
Heather Dyke
Publikováno v:
Philosophies, Vol 8, Iss 2, p 19 (2023)
Metaphysics seeks an account of fundamental reality as it is independent of any observer or point of view. As such, one problem it faces is that any such account is necessarily created by some observer from some point of view. Does this mean that met
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/a793cbe0f76c4374a7f9044ee5c592d2
Autor:
Heather Dyke
This book is an investigation into metaphysics: its aims, scope, methodology and practice. Dyke argues that metaphysics should take itself to be concerned with investigating the fundamental nature of reality, and suggests that the ontological signifi
Autor:
Heather Dyke
Publikováno v:
Disputatio. 13:373-384
Correia and Rosenkranz (C&R) defend their Growing Block theory of time by appealing to the importance of the notion of taking tense seriously. I argue that this phrase is ambiguous, having both a linguistic and a metaphysical interpretation, but neit
Autor:
Heather Dyke
Publikováno v:
Asian Journal of Philosophy. 2
Autor:
Heather Dyke
Publikováno v:
The Philosophical Review. 130:459-463
Autor:
Heather Dyke
Publikováno v:
Mind & Language. 37:605-618
Autor:
Tiddy Smith, Heather Dyke
Publikováno v:
Erkenntnis. 87:2067-2080
It is widely, if not universally, assumed by philosophers that it is impossible to justify the reliability of memory without recourse to the use of memory. This so-called “epistemic circularity” is supposed to infect all attempts to justify memor
Autor:
Heather Dyke
Philosophical thinking about time is characterised by tensions between competing conceptions. Different sources of evidence yield different conclusions about it. Common sense suggests there is an objective present, and that time is dynamic. Science r
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::c4465117a7cf25c7dfdde3489ed94f6d
https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108935517
https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108935517
Autor:
Zach Weber, Heather Dyke
Publikováno v:
Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artificial Intelligence. 25:367-376
This note is about the relationship between mind and metaphysics, examined through the lens of a recent paradox due to Williamson (2002). An apparent consequence of two popular doctrines – the Russellian account of structured propositions and the m
Autor:
James Maclaurin, Heather Dyke
Publikováno v:
Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 91:179-182
We defend our characterization of non-naturalistic metaphysics. Specifically we question McLeod and Parsons's interpretation of the idea of an auxiliary hypothesis. We further argue that our original article does not require that we abandon debate on