Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 112
pro vyhledávání: '"Harrenstein, P."'
Autor:
Fox, James, MacDermott, Matt, Hammond, Lewis, Harrenstein, Paul, Abate, Alessandro, Wooldridge, Michael
Publikováno v:
EPTCS 379, 2023, pp. 201-220
Multi-agent influence diagrams (MAIDs) are a popular game-theoretic model based on Bayesian networks. In some settings, MAIDs offer significant advantages over extensive-form game representations. Previous work on MAIDs has assumed that agents employ
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2307.05059
Autor:
Lee, Wei-Chen, Hyland, David, Abate, Alessandro, Elkind, Edith, Gan, Jiarui, Gutierrez, Julian, Harrenstein, Paul, Wooldridge, Michael
We introduce a natural variant of weighted voting games, which we refer to as k-Prize Weighted Voting Games. Such games consist of n players with weights, and k prizes, of possibly differing values. The players form coalitions, and the i-th largest c
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2302.13888
In 1998 a long-lost proposal for an election law by Gottlob Frege (1848--1925) was rediscovered in the Th\"uringer Universit\"ats- und Landesbibliothek in Jena, Germany. The method that Frege proposed for the election of representatives of a constitu
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1907.03643
Publikováno v:
Logical Methods in Computer Science, Volume 15, Issue 3 (September 20, 2019) lmcs:4791
Game theory provides a well-established framework for the analysis of concurrent and multi-agent systems. The basic idea is that concurrent processes (agents) can be understood as corresponding to players in a game; plays represent the possible compu
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1808.09213
Autor:
Aziz, Haris, Brandl, Florian, Brandt, Felix, Harrenstein, Paul, Olsen, Martin, Peters, Dominik
The work we present in this paper initiated the formal study of fractional hedonic games, coalition formation games in which the utility of a player is the average value he ascribes to the members of his coalition. Among other settings, this covers s
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1705.10116
Autor:
Bachmeier, Georg, Brandt, Felix, Geist, Christian, Harrenstein, Paul, Kardel, Keyvan, Peters, Dominik, Seedig, Hans Georg
Many hardness results in computational social choice make use of the fact that every directed graph may be induced as the pairwise majority relation of some preference profile. However, this fact requires a number of voters that is almost linear in t
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1704.06304
We study hedonic games with dichotomous preferences. Hedonic games are cooperative games in which players desire to form coalitions, but only care about the makeup of the coalitions of which they are members; they are indifferent about the makeup of
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1509.07062
In many-to-many matching models, substitutable preferences constitute the largest domain for which a pairwise stable matching is guaranteed to exist. In this note, we extend the recently proposed algorithm of Hatfield et al. [3] to test substitutabil
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1201.0432
We consider coalition formation games in which each player has preferences over the other players and his preferences over coalitions are based on the best player ($\mathcal{B}$-/B-hedonic games) or the worst player ($\mathcal{W}$/W-hedonic games) in
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1105.1824
Autor:
Brandt, Felix, Harrenstein, Paul
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Theory 146(4), 2011
A common assumption in modern microeconomic theory is that choice should be rationalizable via a binary preference relation, which \citeauthor{Sen71a} showed to be equivalent to two consistency conditions, namely $\alpha$ (contraction) and $\gamma$ (
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/0910.3580