Zobrazeno 1 - 8
of 8
pro vyhledávání: '"Hans van der Stel"'
Autor:
Hans van der Stel
Publikováno v:
Mathematical Social Sciences. 39:277-301
A voting scheme assigns to each profile of alternatives chosen by n individuals a compromise alternative. Here the set of alternatives is represented by the Euclidean plane. The individual utilities for the compromise point are equal to the negatives
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::39655a8cdb131272b051d78eebc0eda0
https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4896(99)00031-1
https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4896(99)00031-1
Publikováno v:
ZOR - Methods and Models of Operations Research. 38:213-229
A voting scheme assigns to each profile of alternatives reported byn individuals a compromise alternative. A voting scheme is strategy-proof if no individual is better off by lying, i.e., not reporting a best alternative. In this paper the main resul
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::5113261c65f6c2985107d38e7b232ec1
https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01414216
https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01414216
Publikováno v:
ZOR Zeitschrift f�r Operations Research Methods and Models of Operations Research. 38:19-53
Generalized location problems withn agents are considered, who each report a point inm-dimensional Euclidean space. A solution assigns a compromise point to thesen points, and the individual utilities for this compromise point are equal to the negati
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::4717113d5e75da02dc57b18ab08fb04c
https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01416005
https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01416005
Publikováno v:
Archives of Otolaryngology-Head & Neck Surgery, 129, 297-304. AMA
Objective: To determine the cost-effectiveness of hearing-aid fitting. Design: Cost-effectiveness analysis using a Markov model based on aggregate data and results from a prospective intervention study. Setting: The cost-effectiveness study was based
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::5bb3a567b7058fa46df4bec2a3c1b24e
https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/a1ea8283-bbcc-4c4e-b7f9-24f717919220
https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/a1ea8283-bbcc-4c4e-b7f9-24f717919220
Autor:
Manuela Joore, Daniëlle Brunenberg, Horst Zank, Hans Van Der Stel, Lucien Anteunis, Gijs Boas, Hans Peters
Publikováno v:
University of Manchester-PURE
The objective was to develop the Audiological Disabilities Preference Index (ADPI), a measure to determine health state preferences associated with audiological disabilities. The ADPI consists of a hearing-related health state description, hearing-re
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=pmid_dedup__::3d2f39699096ff76c42d50ead6d98387
https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/12391946
https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/12391946
Publikováno v:
Social Choice and Welfare, 14, 379-401. Springer
In this paper we characterize strategy-proof voting schemes on Euclidean spaces. A voting scheme is strategy-proof whenever it is optimal for every agent to report his best alternative. Here the individual preferences underlying these best choices ar
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::b0a4de0a62878996f047d05141987798
http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00355/papers/7014003/70140379.pdf
http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00355/papers/7014003/70140379.pdf
Publikováno v:
Operations Research ’91 ISBN: 9783790806083
This abstract is a summary of the main recent results obtained by the three authors concerning strategy-proofness in social choice problems with general (and typically, continuous) domains of alternatives and restricted domains of preferences. Contra
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::090eafb6fef3804a260822c3ac5c4349
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-48417-9_119
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-48417-9_119
Publikováno v:
Scopus-Elsevier
We consider social choice rules which select a lottery over outcomes for each profile of individual preferences. Agents are assumed to have preferences over lotteries satisfying the axioms of expected utility. We exhibit a large class of rules satisf
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::97f2f9ad0fd6f02e33193d0d93e9596d
http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?eid=2-s2.0-0003192620&partnerID=MN8TOARS
http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?eid=2-s2.0-0003192620&partnerID=MN8TOARS