Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 12
pro vyhledávání: '"Hannelore De Silva"'
Autor:
Isamu Okada, Hannelore De Silva
Publikováno v:
Scientific Reports, Vol 14, Iss 1, Pp 1-9 (2024)
Abstract Exploring the evolutionary mechanisms of cooperation in societies where reputational consensus cannot be assumed, as in divided societies, is important for understanding the basic principles of human behavior in modern societies. Indirect re
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/92523811953f43d8af063ca4bfb2cda8
Autor:
Ulrich Berger, Hannelore De Silva
Publikováno v:
PLoS ONE, Vol 16, Iss 6, p e0253344 (2021)
Deterrence, a defender's avoidance of a challenger's attack based on the threat of retaliation, is a basic ingredient of social cooperation in several animal species and is ubiquitous in human societies. Deterrence theory has recognized that deterren
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/4edb7f6af19a4d59be653e9019af4f28
Publikováno v:
Communications in Computer and Information Science ISBN: 9783031143427
Theoretical studies show that a block withholding attack is a considerable weakness of pool mining in Proof-of-Work consensus networks. Several defense mechanisms against the attack have been proposed in the past with a novel approach of sending sens
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::f66427abc01f8933c8c707f8b1d30cf7
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-14343-4_23
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-14343-4_23
Autor:
Hannelore De Silva, Ulrich Berger
Publikováno v:
PLoS ONE, Vol 16, Iss 6, p e0253344 (2021)
PLoS ONE
PLoS ONE
Deterrence, a defender’s avoidance of a challenger’s attack based on the threat of retaliation, is a basic ingredient of social cooperation in several animal species and is ubiquitous in human societies. Deterrence theory has recognized that dete
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::e8117f645826ec8592deca39638cff7c
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0253344
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0253344
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 130:337-348
Experimental tests of choice predictions in one-shot games show only little support for Nash equilibrium (NE). Poisson Cognitive Hierarchy (PCH) and level-k (LK) are behavioral models of the thinking-steps variety where subjects differ in the number
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::5f8dacbcbd4b148dd541103fe16900d6
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2016.08.004
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2016.08.004
Publikováno v:
Dynamic Games and Applications
Punishment of free-riders is generally viewed as an important factor in promoting cooperation. But since it is often costly to sanction exploiters, the emergence of such a behavior and its stability raise interesting problems. Players who do not cont
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::860ba2fb3c67409d350c400543d1e2e2
https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-010-0001-4
https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-010-0001-4
Publikováno v:
Journal of Evolutionary Economics
Cooperation in joint enterprises poses a social dilemma. How can altruistic behavior be sustained if selfish alternatives provide a higher payoff? This social dilemma can be overcome by the threat of sanctions. But a sanctioning system is itself a pu
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::f3010500c9c98a89ae851b3a82893d48
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00191-009-0162-8
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00191-009-0162-8
Publikováno v:
Nature. 466:861-863
Cooperation in evolutionary games can be stabilized through punishment of non-cooperators, at a cost to those who do the punishing. Punishment can take different forms, in particular peer-punishment, in which individuals punish free-riders after the
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::0d2b1c479bad313461c2af18ecb6e5bb
https://doi.org/10.1038/nature09203
https://doi.org/10.1038/nature09203
Publikováno v:
Experimental Economics.
A vast amount of empirical and theoretical research on public good games indicates that the threat of punishment can curb free-riding in human groups engaged in joint enterprises. Since punishment is often costly, however, this raises an issue of sec
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::45b87895eba56c9b5e268e19c3200466
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-013-9367-7
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-013-9367-7
Autor:
Hannelore De Silva, Karl Sigmund
Publikováno v:
Games, Groups, and the Global Good ISBN: 9783540854357
Both the Trust Game and the Ultimatum Game reduce, in their most simplified versions, to a Public Good Game with an added incentive: namely a reward in the first case, and a sanction in the other. In this paper, the evolutionary game dynamics of thes
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::5a28379d4e979abcb4f6786df72a003b
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-85436-4_5
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-85436-4_5