Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 121
pro vyhledávání: '"Han, Seungjin"'
We study monotone equilibrium design by a planner who chooses an interval of reactions that receivers take before senders and receivers move in matching markets with signaling. Given the convex efficiency frontier over sender surplus and receiver sur
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2406.01886
Autor:
Han, Seungjin, Leal, Andrew
This paper proposes Competing Mechanism Games Played Through Agent (CMGPTA), an extension of the GPTA (Prat and Rustichini (2003)), where a Principal can offer any arbitrary mechanism that specifies a transfer schedule for each agent conditional on a
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2403.03317
Autor:
Han, Seungjin, Sam, Alex
We study multidimensional signaling (cognitive/non-cognitive) as a sender's portfolio choice with a resource constraint. We establish the existence of a unique monotone D1 equilibrium where the cognitive (non-cognitive) signal increases (decreases) i
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2402.14003
Autor:
Han, Seungjin, Xiong, Siyang
In classical contract theory, we usually impose two assumptions: delegated contracts and perfect commitment. While the second assumption is demanding, the first one suffers no loss of generality. Following this tradition, current common-agency models
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2309.11595
This paper studies a delegation problem faced by the planner who wants to regulate receivers' reaction choices in markets for matching between receivers and senders with signaling. We provide a noble insight into the planner's willingness to delegate
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2303.09415
In this paper we study treatment assignment rules in the presence of social interaction. We construct an analytical framework under the anonymous interaction assumption, where the decision problem becomes choosing a treatment fraction. We propose a m
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2209.09077
Autor:
Han, Seungjin
This paper proposes the notion of robust PBE in a general competing mechanism game of incomplete information where a mechanism allows its designer to send a message to himself at the same time agents send messages. It identifies the utility environme
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2109.13177
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Theory, Vol 216, Article 105801, 2024
We introduce a notion of competitive signaling equilibrium (CSE) in one-to-one matching markets with a continuum of heterogeneous senders and receivers. We then study monotone CSE where equilibrium outcomes - sender actions, receiver reactions, belie
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2109.03370
Publikováno v:
In Journal of Economic Theory March 2024 216
