Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 13
pro vyhledávání: '"Haldun Evrenk"'
Autor:
Mustafa Kadir Doğan, Haldun Evrenk
Publikováno v:
Volume: 75, Issue: 3 871-898
Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi
Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi
This paper studies the effects of corruption on voting behavior in the local and general elections, investigating how the voters’ response to corruption differs in these elections. We have two main research questions: (i) how does the electoral pun
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::a1788843b9015d79d448c39c74a85470
https://doi.org/10.33630/ausbf.782937
https://doi.org/10.33630/ausbf.782937
Autor:
M. Kadir Doğan, Haldun Evrenk
Publikováno v:
Turkish Studies. 22:331-356
Using data collected from an embedded survey administered to a nationally representative sample in Turkey, we test three common explanations for the re-election of corrupt politicians: Lack of Reli...
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::aaa93ab00e3eb543e79cd50ff6f10cbc
https://doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2020.1815534
https://doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2020.1815534
Autor:
Haldun Evrenk
In the context of politics, the term valence refers to bonds between candidates and some desirable qualities in the public’s mind. This chapter provides a review of formal models of spatial political competition when candidates differ in their exog
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::ce9182d44a61657ca5f002049161396b
https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469733.013.13
https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469733.013.13
Publikováno v:
European Journal of Political Economy. 29:168-182
We compare the legislature quality under an exclusive, centralized selectorate (such as a party-principal) with that under an inclusive, decentralized selectorate (such as a party-primary). In our model, two parties compete over three districts: two
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::43ac83662ccedc5d7532be208c51cd8f
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2012.10.005
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2012.10.005
Autor:
Haldun Evrenk
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 80:498-510
Using a theoretical model of repeated political competition among two career politicians, I study the incentives of both the corrupt and clean politicians not to adopt a fully effective reform targeting political corruption. In the setup I study, eac
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::3f38e1f1b9c01e592d2a718548b5ac9d
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2011.05.004
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2011.05.004
Autor:
Haldun Evrenk, Dmitriy Kha
Publikováno v:
Public Choice. 147:421-438
We study the effects of stochastic (probabilistic) voting on equilibrium locations, equilibrium vote shares and comparative statics in a setup with three heterogeneous candidates and a single-dimensional issue space. Comparing the equilibria with and
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::f885c70b6dbb4894b49fc4b813cd34c0
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-010-9639-0
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-010-9639-0
Autor:
Haldun Evrenk, Ünal Zenginobuz
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economics. 99:211-237
This paper proposes a mechanism for the regulation of duopolies a revenue contests among the firms. Under the mechanism, the firm with the lower revenue is to pay a penalty to the firm with the higher revenue proportional to the difference between th
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::cf7b24b45d585b06f5515985117f64c8
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-009-0107-6
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-009-0107-6
Autor:
Haldun Evrenk
Publikováno v:
Public Choice. 139:121-124
Published in a past issue of this journal, Hug (Public Choice 82:159–180, 1995) studies political competition among three vote-maximizing parties when voters cannot know exactly which policies the parties will adopt when elected. Contrary to what i
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::a7266d534dc2e29c77fd7c10a98605b0
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-008-9382-y
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-008-9382-y
Autor:
Haldun Evrenk
Publikováno v:
Social Choice and Welfare. 32:157-168
We study the Nash Equilibrium of three-candidate unidimensional spatial competition when candidates differ in their non-policy characteristics (valence). If the voters’ policy preferences are represented by a strictly convex loss function, and if t
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::8ab1c68718addc3c9daa7b44abfe494c
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-008-0306-z
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-008-0306-z
Autor:
Haldun Evrenk, Chien Yuan Sher
Prior studies of strategic voting in multi-party elections potentially overestimate the extent of it by counting erroneously votes cast under different motivations as strategic votes. We propose a method that corrects some of this overestimation by d
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::92e421d412d67adc6decadd3bb5b04c2
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/1744
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/1744