Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 62
pro vyhledávání: '"Haghpanah, Nima"'
Autor:
Haghpanah, Nima, Siegel, Ron
We consider a monopolistic seller in a market that may be segmented. The surplus of each consumer in a segment depends on the price that the seller optimally charges, which depends on the set of consumers in the segment. We study which segmentations
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2210.13194
The seller of an asset has the option to buy hard information about the value of the asset from an intermediary. The seller can then disclose the acquired information before selling the asset in a competitive market. We study how the intermediary des
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2010.08037
Akademický článek
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In the multi-unit pricing problem, multiple units of a single item are for sale. A buyer's valuation for $n$ units of the item is $v \min \{ n, d\} $, where the per unit valuation $v$ and the capacity $d$ are private information of the buyer. We cons
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1704.05027
Autor:
Haghpanah, Nima
This thesis studies the design of Bayesian revenue-optimal auctions for a class of problems in which buyers have general (non-linear and multi-parameter) preferences. This class includes the classical linear single-parameter problem considered by Mye
Externí odkaz:
http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=3638183
We provide a characterization of revenue-optimal dynamic mechanisms in settings where a monopolist sells k items over k periods to a buyer who realizes his value for item i in the beginning of period i. We require that the mechanism satisfies a stron
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1603.07229
Publikováno v:
In Journal of Economic Theory April 2021 193
Publikováno v:
In Games and Economic Behavior May 2020 121:482-505
Cr\'emer and McLean [1985] showed that, when buyers' valuations are drawn from a correlated distribution, an auction with full knowledge on the distribution can extract the full social surplus. We study whether this phenomenon persists when the aucti
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1406.1571
Autor:
Haghpanah, Nima, Hartline, Jason
We consider a multi-dimensional screening problem of selling a product with multiple quality levels and design virtual value functions to derive conditions that imply optimality of only selling highest quality. A challenge of designing virtual values
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1404.1341