Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 48
pro vyhledávání: '"Habis, Helga"'
Autor:
Habis, Helga
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Studies, 2024, Vol. 51, Issue 9, pp. 200-211.
Externí odkaz:
http://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/10.1108/JES-11-2023-0640
Autor:
Habis, Helga
Publikováno v:
In Finance Research Letters May 2024 63
Autor:
Habis, Helga, Herings, P. Jean-Jacques
Publikováno v:
In Journal of Mathematical Economics August-October 2011 47(4-5):595-609
Autor:
Habis, Helga1 helga.habis@uni-corvinus.hu, Perge, Laura1 laura.perge@gmail.com
Publikováno v:
Economic Review / Kozgazdasagi Szemle. Jun2018, Vol. 65, p619-631. 13p.
Autor:
Habis, Helga1 helga.habis@nek.lu.se, Csercsik, Dávid csercsik@itk.ppke.hu
Publikováno v:
Networks & Spatial Economics. Mar2015, Vol. 15 Issue 1, p1-16. 16p.
Autor:
Habis, Helga helga.habis@uni-corvinus.hu, Herings, P.1 P.Herings@maastrichtuniversity.nl
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Game Theory. Nov2013, Vol. 42 Issue 4, p973-988. 16p.
Autor:
Habis, Helga
Publikováno v:
Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences). (12):1299-1310
A kooperatív játékelmélet egyik legjelentősebb eredménye, hogy számos konfliktushelyzetben stabil megoldást nyújt. Ez azonban csak statikus és determinisztikus környezetben alkalmazható jól. Most megmutatjuk a mag egy olyan kiterjesztés
Autor:
Gudmundsson, Jens, Habis, Helga
We examine assignment games, wherematched pairs of firms and workers create some monetary value to distribute among themselves and the agents aim to maximize their payoff. In the majority of this literature, externalities - in the sense that a pair
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dedup_wf_001::471a43432282b0ec469d85a66203ed86
http://unipub.lib.uni-corvinus.hu/2063/
http://unipub.lib.uni-corvinus.hu/2063/
Autor:
Andersson, Tommy, Erlanson, Albin, Gudmundsson, Jens, Habis, Helga, Ingebretsen Carlson, Jim, Kratz, Jörgen
We present a polynomial time method for identifying the maximal set in excess demand at a given payoff vector. This set can be used in "large" partnership formation problems to identify the minimum element in the set of individually rational payoff v
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od______1687::f923617304a54fd60374e032c64f2ac4
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/260106
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/260106
Autor:
Gudmundsson, Jens, Habis, Helga
We introduce externalities into a two-sided, one-to-one assignment game by letting the values generated by pairs depend on the behavior of the other agents. Extending the notion of blocking to this setup is not straightforward; a pair has to take int
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od______1687::7abd28d8c180c067af6405aba05a2267
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/260084
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/260084