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of 70
pro vyhledávání: '"HB135-147"'
We study Nash implementation under complete information with the distinctive feature that the planner knows neither individuals’ state-contingent preferences (payoff states) nor how they correspond to the states of the economy on which the social g
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::e4186578b9d3ac72e16cab92cc21343b
Autor:
Mehmet Barlo, Nuh Aygun DALKIRAN
Following a theoretical analysis of the scope of Nash implementation for a given mechanism, we study the formal framework for computational identification of Nash implementability. We provide computational tools for Nash implementation in finite envi
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::37c46305166698128a1419fb48bf7f6c
Publikováno v:
Journal of Statistical Software; Vol. 102 (2022); 1-30
The R package econet provides methods for estimating parameter-dependent network centrality measures with linear-in-means models. Both nonlinear least squares and maximum likelihood estimators are implemented. The methods allow for both link and node
Autor:
Darjus Hosszejni, Gregor Kastner
Publikováno v:
Journal of Statistical Software; Vol. 100 (2021); 1-34
Stochastic volatility (SV) models are nonlinear state-space models that enjoy increasing popularity for fitting and predicting heteroskedastic time series. However, due to the large number of latent quantities, their efficient estimation is non-trivi
Autor:
Barlo, Mehmet, Dalkıran, Nuh Aygün
We analyze implementation in environments where planners observe societies’ incomplete choice data and are partially informed about how to associate individuals’ preferences with states of the economy, on which desired collective goals depend. We
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od______1246::2a312a0ef73fc6ac52317e9f256189a4
https://research.sabanciuniv.edu/id/eprint/44750/
https://research.sabanciuniv.edu/id/eprint/44750/
Autor:
Mustafa Oguz Afacan
Publikováno v:
Journal of Mathematical Economics. 82:285-290
We consider a task-allocation problem in which agents differ in terms of their seniority and their experience with tasks. We introduce two mechanism classes: the feasibility augmented serial dictatorship ( F S D ) and the minimally reluctant efficien
Autor:
Barlo, Mehmet, Dalkıran, Nuh Aygün
Following a theoretical analysis of the scope of Nash implementation for a given mechanism, we study the formal framework for computational identification of Nash implementability. We provide computational tools for Nash implementation in finite envi
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od______1246::450af9bd2f772af2b5141aeb6ed662b8
https://research.sabanciuniv.edu/id/eprint/41617/
https://research.sabanciuniv.edu/id/eprint/41617/
Autor:
Barlo, Mehmet, Dalkıran, Nuh Aygün
We formalize suitable notions of implementation for environments in which planners do not observe all the data on individuals' choices and are partially informed about the association of individuals' preferences with states of the economy, on which d
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od______1246::8d046679552c63f1469cad5652aa6e1b
https://research.sabanciuniv.edu/id/eprint/41616/
https://research.sabanciuniv.edu/id/eprint/41616/
Autor:
Ayca Ozdogan, Mehmet Barlo
This paper asks whether or not it is possible to induce agents to good behavior permanently via regulators' reputations and attain perpetual social efficiency. We propose and analyze a repeated incomplete information game with a specific payoff and m
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::94556a827ef16642df46d2e11512bb23
https://research.sabanciuniv.edu/id/eprint/40690/
https://research.sabanciuniv.edu/id/eprint/40690/
Autor:
Özdoğan, Ayça, Barlo, Mehmet
This paper asks whether or not it is possible to induce agents to good behavior permanently via regulators' reputations and attain perpetual social efficiency. We propose and analyze a repeated incomplete information game with a suitable payoff and m
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dedup_wf_001::d440afd966f175089c9e1e20fc14af0a
https://research.sabanciuniv.edu/id/eprint/40695/
https://research.sabanciuniv.edu/id/eprint/40695/