Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 32
pro vyhledávání: '"Gwenaël Piaser"'
Autor:
Gwenaël Piaser, Frédéric Loss
Publikováno v:
Journal of Mathematical Economics. 81:22-30
We consider a competitive insurance market in which agents can privately enter into multi-contractual insurance relationships and undertake hidden actions. We study the existence of a linear equilibrium when insurance companies have no restrictions o
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::acee34ff500b503b931cdc36f26d6c93
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.12.006
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.12.006
Publikováno v:
Games and Economic Behavior
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, 2021, vol. 125, pp.79-93. ⟨10.1016/j.geb.2020.10.006⟩
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, 2021, vol. 125, pp.79-93. ⟨10.1016/j.geb.2020.10.006⟩
National audience; We study competing-mechanism games under exclusive competition: principals first simultaneously post mechanisms, after which agents simultaneously choose to participate and communicate with at most one principal. In this setting, w
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::9d2b788f17a78b41f83ff9006d5b63b8
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03106896/document
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03106896/document
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Theory
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, 2019, 183, pp.258-283. ⟨10.1016/j.jet.2019.06.002⟩
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, 2019, 183, pp.258-283. ⟨10.1016/j.jet.2019.06.002⟩
International audience; We study games in which principals simultaneously post mechanisms in the presence of several agents. We evaluate the role of principals' communication in these settings. As in Myerson (1982), each principal may generate incomp
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::b9c2cb5d2fe4496804d8cd130a4e667a
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022053118304800
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022053118304800
Publikováno v:
Games and Economic Behavior
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, 2018, 111, pp.1-15. ⟨10.1016/j.geb.2018.06.001⟩
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, 2018, 111, pp.1-15. ⟨10.1016/j.geb.2018.06.001⟩
We study games in which several principals design mechanisms in the presence of privately informed agents. Competition is exclusive: each type of each agent can participate with at most one principal and meaningfully communicate only with him. Exclus
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::35aef558c5b84bc0b76bef78934fecbb
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01897713
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01897713
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
We study competing mechanism games in which principals simultaneously design contracts to deal with several agents. We show that principals can profit from privately communicating with agents by generating incomplete information in the continuation g
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::38459688af7aa910e1c66e84aa4da6ce
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3088701
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3088701
Publikováno v:
Games and Economic Behavior. 68:376-380
In multiple-principal multiple-agent models of moral hazard, we provide sufficient conditions for the outcomes of pure-strategy equilibria in direct mechanisms to be preserved when principals can offer indirect communication schemes. The conditions i
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::0a93ff7f2dbda27bfa3d2d3d38278e46
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.07.010
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.07.010
Publikováno v:
Mathematical Social Sciences. 56:75-95
This paper examines the role of direct mechanisms in common agency games. We focus on deterministic contracts and show how the introduction of a separability condition on the preferences of the agent is sufficient for the Revelation Principle to hold
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::6709d594751175331cdb11e46b2832ef
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.11.001
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.11.001
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Theory. 135:590-593
In a recent paper, Peters [Negotiation and take-it or leave-it in common agency, J. Econ. Theory 111 (2003) 189–228] identifies a set of restrictions on players’ preferences, called “no-externalities assumption”, under which, in common agency
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::fcc066f5a21a15f4f4ba6d53bfeb76ed
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.02.006
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.02.006
Autor:
Denis Raynaud, Gwenaël Piaser
Publikováno v:
Revue économique. 53:113-133
We analyze the income effect on the probability of visiting a doctor from a french survey. We show that forpeople with low income this probability is increasing with income, even if they have a private Insurance.
Nous analysons l'impact du reven
Nous analysons l'impact du reven
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::56fc1f46f59dca0684700590d9aaa906
https://doi.org/10.3406/reco.2002.410393
https://doi.org/10.3406/reco.2002.410393