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pro vyhledávání: '"Goran Doychev"'
Publikováno v:
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security. 18:1-32
We present CacheAudit, a versatile framework for the automatic, static analysis of cache side channels. CacheAudit takes as input a program binary and a cache configuration and derives formal, quantitative security guarantees for a comprehensive set
Autor:
Boris Köpf, Goran Doychev
Publikováno v:
CSF
Timing attacks can effectively recover keys from cryptosystems. While they can be defeated using constant-time implementations, this defensive approach comes at the price of a performance penalty. One is hence faced with the problem of striking a bal
Autor:
Michael Backes, Goran Doychev
Publikováno v:
Preventing Side-Channel Leaks in Web Traffic: A Formal Approach.
Publikováno v:
Computer Security – ESORICS 2010 ISBN: 9783642154966
ESORICS
ESORICS
Transmitting voice communication over untrusted networks puts personal information at risk. Although voice streams are typically encrypted to prevent unwanted eavesdropping, additional features of voice communication protocols might still allow eaves
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::b30f00da4353859ed14e4827f4cc7ec9
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-15497-3_31
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-15497-3_31
Autor:
Goran Doychev
Publikováno v:
Archivo Digital UPM
Universidad Politécnica de Madrid
Universidad Politécnica de Madrid
Side-channel attacks have been successful in breaking cryptographic protections of systems, by using secret-dependent variations of non-functional properties such as timing or traffic volume. Countermeasures against side-channel attacks usually attem
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::77dd8c9de8975604920b2d7b034d457d
http://hdl.handle.net/10803/454196
http://hdl.handle.net/10803/454196