Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 992
pro vyhledávání: '"Goldberg, Paul A."'
Autor:
Lock, Edwin, Evans, Benjamin Patrick, Kreacic, Eleonora, Bhatt, Sujay, Koppel, Alec, Ganesh, Sumitra, Goldberg, Paul W.
We propose a decentralized market model in which agents can negotiate bilateral contracts. This builds on a similar, but centralized, model of trading networks introduced by Hatfield et al. (2013). Prior work has established that fully-substitutable
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2412.13972
Autor:
Tewolde, Emanuel, Zhang, Brian Hu, Oesterheld, Caspar, Zampetakis, Manolis, Sandholm, Tuomas, Goldberg, Paul W., Conitzer, Vincent
We investigate optimal decision making under imperfect recall, that is, when an agent forgets information it once held before. An example is the absentminded driver game, as well as team games in which the members have limited communication capabilit
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2406.15970
Tullock contests model real-life scenarios that range from competition among proof-of-work blockchain miners to rent-seeking and lobbying activities. We show that continuous-time best-response dynamics in Tullock contests with convex costs converges
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2402.08541
It is well known that solving a (non-convex) quadratic program is NP-hard. We show that the problem remains hard even if we are only looking for a Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) point, instead of a global optimum. Namely, we prove that computing a KKT poin
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2311.13738
Markets with multiple divisible goods have been studied widely from the perspective of revenue and welfare. In general, it is well known that envy-free revenue-maximal outcomes can result in lower welfare than competitive equilibrium outcomes. We stu
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2310.03692
We study single-player extensive-form games with imperfect recall, such as the Sleeping Beauty problem or the Absentminded Driver game. For such games, two natural equilibrium concepts have been proposed as alternative solution concepts to ex-ante op
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2305.17805
Autor:
Ghosh, Abheek, Goldberg, Paul W.
We study the convergence of best-response dynamics in lottery contests. We show that best-response dynamics rapidly converges to the (unique) equilibrium for homogeneous agents but may not converge for non-homogeneous agents, even for two non-homogen
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2305.10881
We consider the problem of sharing a set of indivisible goods among agents in a fair manner, namely such that the allocation is envy-free up to any good (EFX). We focus on the problem of computing an EFX allocation in the two-agent case and character
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2301.10354
Autor:
Goldberg, Paul W., Katzman, Matthew J.
Lipschitz games, in which there is a limit $\lambda$ (the Lipschitz value of the game) on how much a player's payoffs may change when some other player deviates, were introduced about 10 years ago by Azrieli and Shmaya. They showed via the probabilis
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2207.09962
We study a general scenario of simultaneous contests that allocate prizes based on equal sharing: each contest awards its prize to all players who satisfy some contest-specific criterion, and the value of this prize to a winner decreases as the numbe
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2207.08151