Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 19
pro vyhledávání: '"Gloria Sheu"'
Publikováno v:
Finance and Economics Discussion Series. :1-45
We study the welfare impacts of mergers in markets where some firms are already vertically integrated. Our model features logit Bertrand competition downstream and Nash Bargaining upstream. We numerically simulate four merger types: vertical mergers
Publikováno v:
American Economic Review. 111:3123-3159
We study a repeated game of price leadership in which a firm proposes supermarkups over Bertrand prices to a coalition of rivals. Supermarkups and marginal costs are recoverable from data on prices and quantities using the model’s structure. In an
Autor:
Gloria Sheu, Charles Taragin
Publikováno v:
The RAND Journal of Economics. 52:596-632
We model a two-level supply chain where Nash bargaining occurs upstream, while firms compete in a differentiated products logit setting downstream. The parameters of this model can be calibrated with a discrete set of data on prices, margins, and m
Autor:
Gloria Sheu, Nathan H. Miller
Publikováno v:
Review of Industrial Organization. 58:143-177
We describe the quantitative modeling techniques that are used in horizontal merger review for the evaluation of unilateral effects, and discuss how the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines helped legitimize these methods and motivate scholarly research
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Publikováno v:
The Review of Economic Studies. 86:2668-2712
Exporting firms often enter foreign markets that are similar to their previous export destinations. We develop a dynamic model in which a firm’s exports in a market may depend on how similar the market is to the firm’s home country (gravity) and
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
The diversion ratio is a key input to indicators of merger harm like up- ward pricing pressure. Measuring the diversion ratio, however, is challenging in the presence of consumer switching costs. We propose an identification strategy for diversion th
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Industrial Organization. 52:216-247
We use Monte Carlo experiments to evaluate whether “upward pricing pressure” (UPP) accurately predicts the price effects of mergers, motivated by the observation that UPP is a restricted form of the first order approximation derived in Jaffe and
Publikováno v:
The RAND Journal of Economics. 48:69-93
We estimate pass-through with thirty years of data from a concentrated industry. The empirical model accounts for oligopoly interactions, yet facilitates estimation with aggregate price data. Robust statistical evidence supports that industry-wide co
Publikováno v:
The Journal of Industrial Economics. 64:683-709
We use Monte Carlo experiments to study how pass‐through can improve merger price predictions, focusing on the first order approximation (FOA) proposed in Jaffe and Weyl [[Jaffe, S., 2013]]. FOA addresses the functional form misspecification that c