Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 14
pro vyhledávání: '"Giulio Trigilia"'
Classical security design papers equate competitive capital markets to securities being fairly priced in expectation. We revisit Nachman and Noe’s (1994) adverse selection setting, modeling capital market competition as free entry of investors and
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::ee3366339347b453d29a6ced85751695
https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/176647/1/Separating_equilibria_under_pricing_and_security_design_JFE_Accepted_Version_22_07_2021_.pdf
https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/176647/1/Separating_equilibria_under_pricing_and_security_design_JFE_Accepted_Version_22_07_2021_.pdf
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::d4e305fc5c30644d9959a11633cccc98
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4283044
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4283044
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
We show that when borrowers are privately informed about their creditworthiness and lenders have a soft budget constraint, efficient investment requires a limit on the fraction of a firm’s cash flows that can be pledged to outsiders. That is, pledg
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::c91b0e9c4efb9f36d32cee59935cef5e
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3759075
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3759075
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
This paper derives conditions under which the introduction of a third-party agent solves the renegotiation-proofness problem of Moore and Repullo (1988)-type mechanisms, without introducing the potential for other agents to collude with the third-par
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::dda8385d337fbc49d2045d39af4d4844
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3800993
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3800993
We show that in the limited-commitment framework of Donaldson, Gromb, and Piacentino (2019), firm value always increases in the fraction of cash flows that can be pledged as collateral. That is, pledgeability increases investment efficiency and relax
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::92136f521133f3116a26bfc69bd723ed
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/136236/1/WRAP-Is-there-paradox-pledgeability-Bernhardt-2020.pdf
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/136236/1/WRAP-Is-there-paradox-pledgeability-Bernhardt-2020.pdf
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Classical security design papers equate competitive capital markets to securities being fairly-priced in expectation. We revisit the adverse selection setting of Nachman and Noe (1994), modeling capital-market competition as free entry of investors,
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::9e1caf58dfd2c1f18ab229b0f89d0f93
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3671813
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3671813
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
We provide theoretical foundations for positive lender profits in competitive credit markets with asymmetric information, where potential borrowers have scarce collateralizable assets. Strikingly, when some borrowers have negative net present value p
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::41dbb7eae119ca09e3ca1113059c2279
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3600046
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3600046
Publikováno v:
Review of Corporate Finance Studies
We consider a model of external financing under ex ante asymmetric information and profit manipulation (non verifability). Contrary to conventional wisdom, the optimal contract is not standard debt, and it is not monotonic. Instead, it resembles a co
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::aff3dda34c1dff56f0b900153f69f0b9
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/108760/7/WRAP-optimal-security-design-asymmetric-Kozhan-2018.pdf
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/108760/7/WRAP-optimal-security-design-asymmetric-Kozhan-2018.pdf
Autor:
Pingle Wang, Giulio Trigilia
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
We study momentum and its predictability within equities listed at the London Stock Exchange (1820-1930). At the time, this was the largest and most liquid stock market and it was thinly regulated, making for a good laboratory to perform out-of-sampl
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::d1e801ddc60d0a4012b805dd91e43a97
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3373164
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3373164
Autor:
Shiming Fu, Giulio Trigilia
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
We study a dynamic moral hazard setting where the manager has private ev- idence that predicts the firm's cash flows. When performance is low, bad news disclosure is rewarded by a lower borrowing cost relative to the no-evidence case. In contrast, no
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::e7952f452b2b02f698449653db96de23
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3120665
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3120665