Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 10
pro vyhledávání: '"Giulio Piccirilli"'
Autor:
Giulio Piccirilli, Gianluca Femminis
In a Gaussian-quadratic economy with dispersed information, we correct the inefficiency in information acquisition by making the tax rate on agents own actions contingent on actions themselves. This aligns individual and social evaluations of informa
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::8948245c93c01f149d162129c5fa1e85
http://hdl.handle.net/10807/187932
http://hdl.handle.net/10807/187932
Publikováno v:
Public Choice, 190(3-4), 365. Springer Netherlands
We model a two-party electoral game with rationally inattentive voters. Parties are endowed with different administrative competencies and announce a fiscal platform to be credibly implemented in case of electoral success. The budgetary impact of eac
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::d543d3b7e267552c9ed7269d0d4cb39c
https://hdl.handle.net/1874/423028
https://hdl.handle.net/1874/423028
Publikováno v:
Economic Notes. 47:245-304
Using survey data on a sample of the Italian population, in this paper we offer a comprehensive account of which personal characteristics are associated to adequate financial competence and wise financial behaviour. The study uses five indicators of
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::17ed73b1012ced09cef0b2f623606153
https://doi.org/10.1111/ecno.12111
https://doi.org/10.1111/ecno.12111
Autor:
Giulio Piccirilli, Gianluca Femminis
We study investments in education made by a continuum of individuals under imperfect information on returns. In the model, the wage accruing to single units of human capital is bargained in the labour market. In addition, this wage depends positively
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::8726c409e39a8a91a015f018c3bec490
http://hdl.handle.net/10807/154088
http://hdl.handle.net/10807/154088
Autor:
Giulio Piccirilli
Publikováno v:
Oxford Economic Papers. 62:803-824
In a dynamic stochastic union model, we show that firing costs have a small and ambiguous impact on the level of employment if the union precommits to future wages. Further, in comparison with the commitment equilibrium and for very general union pre
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::003776b23a488835072d4ea8cf850891
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/oep/gpq005
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/oep/gpq005
Autor:
Giulio Piccirilli
Publikováno v:
Research in Economics. 63:135-143
In a setting that focuses on efficient dynamic hours-workers substitution we show that contingent worksharing contributes to workers retention during bad business spells and to sustained hiring during good spells. As a consequence, average employment
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::1a01e370faa01127fa8839c4961f03d1
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rie.2009.04.001
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rie.2009.04.001
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
We model a two-parties electoral game in an environment where voters are imperfectly informed on the administrative ability of each party. In equilibrium, parties try to manipulate voters’ beliefs and implement fiscal policies that are looser than
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::243a25beea1bfa80232b54109cc8f2c6
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2863016
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2863016
Autor:
Giulio Piccirilli
Publikováno v:
Contributions in Macroeconomics. 4
We present an economy composed of many sectors. In each sector, a simple dynamic stochastic game is played between a wage-setting union and many competitive firms that choose employment. Firms are subject to linear workforce adjustment costs whilst t
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::ef8733489514e001119b81cb8dad3e89
https://doi.org/10.2202/1534-5998.1189
https://doi.org/10.2202/1534-5998.1189
This paper investigates the reaction of active union members towards workplace organizational changes. We use micro-data from a large firm and estimate an empirical model which deals explicitly with the potential endogeneity of the union activist sta
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::87ae3b5736bfecb9b3864b93f02df9d5
http://hdl.handle.net/10807/11986
http://hdl.handle.net/10807/11986