Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 11
pro vyhledávání: '"Giovanni Ursino"'
Publikováno v:
The Economic Journal. 130:2175-2206
We consider a situation in which a decision-maker gathers information from imperfectly informed experts, receiving coarse signals about a uniform state of the world. Private information is (conditionally) correlated across players, and communication
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::e0b6e379eb2ae4c5bcd153f9d6304170
https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/ueaa039
https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/ueaa039
Autor:
Giovanni Ursino, Ferdinando Colombo
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
We study the role of beliefs about experts' honesty in a market for credence goods with second opinions and overtreatment. Experts are honest or dishonest. The population shares a common belief about the share of honest experts, which may be incorrec
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::c3daa543d86a91fb6dc0bd1aba21cabc
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3754303
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3754303
Publikováno v:
Management Science. 64:401-420
The business model of low-cost carriers is now well established and accounts for a large share of Western civil aviation, particularly in Europe. To understand why it has proven so successful, we develop a theoretical model that exploits the two-side
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::e72b8ed79fd878ed4a6e9fbe47a07ca3
https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2016.2601
https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2016.2601
Publikováno v:
The RAND Journal of Economics. 46:611-624
There are two competing sellers of an experience good, one offers high quality, one low. The low-quality seller can engage in deceptive advertising, potentially fooling a buyer into thinking the product is better than it is. Although deceptive advert
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::c33fe94e11f1bcd36fbf20a7a7d9af2c
https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12099
https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12099
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
We consider a situation where a decision maker gathers information from two or more imperfectly informed experts. Private information is (conditionally) correlated across players, and communication is cheap talk. We show that with two experts correla
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::4dad78bf0f0ad6fdd54de58ff870cf30
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2802314
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2802314
We consider a game of information transmission, with one informed decision maker gathering information from one or more informed senders. Private information is (conditionally) correlated across players, and communication is cheap talk. For the one s
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dedup_wf_001::5830a46c1db6052420e32f9b718f384b
http://dipartimenti.unicatt.it/economia-finanza-def024.pdf
http://dipartimenti.unicatt.it/economia-finanza-def024.pdf
We study internal incentives, transparency and firm performance in multidivisional organizations. Two independent divisions of the same firm design internal incentives, and decide whether to publicly disclose their performances. In each division a ri
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::9e9994bac3a7330509ae06e7dcaf3088
http://hdl.handle.net/10446/77592
http://hdl.handle.net/10446/77592
We study a simple game in which two sellers supply goods whose quality cannot be assessed by consumers even after consumption but can be verified with some probability by a public authority. Sellers may induce a prospective buyer into a bad purchase
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::adc2c13ed1f6ebda02cdae6ca1bfa4b2
http://www.csef.it/WP/wp348.pdf
http://www.csef.it/WP/wp348.pdf
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
We consider a game of information transmission, with one informed decision maker gathering information from one or more informed senders. Private information is (conditionally) correlated across players, and communication is cheap talk. For the one s
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::2716c97bd412fdd7180ce68b11992e0c
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2333576
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2333576
Autor:
Giovanni Ursino, Greg Barron
Recent research has focused on the “description-experience gap”: while rare events are overweighted in description based decisions, people tend to behave as if they underweight rare events in decisions based on experience. Barron and Erev (2003)
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::1369cf06b461cba16dea071a3654d355
http://www.unicatt.it/Istituti/EconomiaImpresaLavoro/Quaderni/ieil0054.pdf
http://www.unicatt.it/Istituti/EconomiaImpresaLavoro/Quaderni/ieil0054.pdf