Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 20
pro vyhledávání: '"Germain Gaudin"'
Autor:
Germain Gaudin, Despoina Mantzari
Publikováno v:
Journal of European Competition Law & Practice. 13:125-135
Autor:
Germain Gaudin
Publikováno v:
RAND Journal of Economics
RAND Journal of Economics, Wiley, 2019, 50 (2), pp.342-358. ⟨10.1111/1756-2171.12272⟩
RAND Journal of Economics, Wiley, 2019, 50 (2), pp.342-358. ⟨10.1111/1756-2171.12272⟩
This article revisits the opportunism problem faced by an upstream monopolist contracting with several retailers over secret agreements, when contracts are linear. We characterize the equilibrium under secret contracts and compare it to that under pu
Autor:
Germain Gaudin, Franziska Weber
Publikováno v:
Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, 12(5), 370-379. Oxford University Press
Key Points Following (price-increasing) competition law infringements, consumer harm is two-fold. Consumers are negatively impacted by (i) the overcharge (they pay more for the goods actually purchased during the infringement period) and (ii) a ‘lo
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::48f8d7348eaa314f87e71c5bba610acc
https://pure.eur.nl/en/publications/6d4da9bc-4360-4d23-b1ff-9978fb953453
https://pure.eur.nl/en/publications/6d4da9bc-4360-4d23-b1ff-9978fb953453
Autor:
Germain Gaudin, Alexander White
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Platforms acting as sales channels for producers often charge users for access via a subscription fee or a markup on hardware. We compare two common forms of vertical pricing agreement that platforms use with sellers: per unit and proportional fees.
Autor:
Germain Gaudin
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
We study the relationship between market power and quality supply. We develop a flexible approach to imperfect competition in product qualities and prices (or quantities), which encompasses several existing models. We uncover sufficient statistics, i
Autor:
Germain Gaudin, Romain Lestage
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
We analyse the effects of input price discrimination in the canonical model where an upstream monopolist sells to downstream firms with various degrees of efficiency. We first recast a series of existing results within our setting, extending previous
Autor:
Germain Gaudin
Publikováno v:
Economic Journal
Economic Journal, Wiley, 2018, 128 (614), pp.2380-2413. ⟨10.1111/ecoj.12506⟩
Economic Journal, Wiley, 2018, 128 (614), pp.2380-2413. ⟨10.1111/ecoj.12506⟩
This paper investigates the effects of changes in retail market concentration when input prices are negotiated. Results are derived from a model of bilateral Nash-bargaining between upstream and downstream firms which allows for general forms of dema
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::4a2671a41b37dbe53e7106e679e5084b
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02410485
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02410485
Autor:
Germain Gaudin, Marc Bourreau
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economics and Management Strategy
Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Wiley, In press, ⟨10.1111/jems.12452⟩
Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Wiley, In press, ⟨10.1111/jems.12452⟩
We consider a platform that carries content from two upstream content providers and presents personalized recommendations to participating customers. We focus on streaming platforms in media markets, where users pay a subscription fee to join the pla
Autor:
Claudia Saavedra, Germain Gaudin
Publikováno v:
Telecommunications Policy
Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, 2014, 38 (2), pp.157-172. ⟨10.1016/j.telpol.2013.08.005⟩
Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, 2014, 38 (2), pp.157-172. ⟨10.1016/j.telpol.2013.08.005⟩
This paper studies the implementation of Reasonably Efficient Operator margin squeeze tests by National Regulatory Authorities in European telecommunications markets. It provides a theoretical framework which shows how regulatory authorities deal wit
Autor:
Germain Gaudin
Publikováno v:
Economics Letters
Economics Letters, Elsevier, 2016, 139, pp.1-4. ⟨10.1016/j.econlet.2015.11.043⟩
Economics Letters, Elsevier, 2016, 139, pp.1-4. ⟨10.1016/j.econlet.2015.11.043⟩
This paper analyzes the determinants of pass-through that are specific to vertical relationships between wholesalers and retailers. The type of vertical agreement firms contract upon as well as their relative bargaining power are identified as major
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::80790ac99e9466b948190ccca0daaa14
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02410488
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02410488