Výsledky vyhledávání - "George Pennacchi"

The Role of Marketplace Lending in Credit Markets: Evidence from Bank Mergers

Autor: Nikolaos A. Mylonopoulos, George Pennacchi, Panagiotis Avramidis

Publikováno v: Management Science. 68:3090-3111

We develop a model of competition between banks and a marketplace lender to motivate empirical tests using local market data on U.S. banks and the largest marketplace lending platform. Employing mergers of large, multimarket banks as an exogenous cre

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::d8d7dfdb88c5b79b78a73b872b2b390e
https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.3996

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How should governments create liquidity?

Autor: George Pennacchi, Timothy Jackson

Publikováno v: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS

Safe assets (liquidity) can be created by an economy’s private banking system and also by its government. Our model shows that some banks create liquidity with low debt and efficient loan monitoring while other banks use high, tranched debt and ine

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::b8fee7f044b1f1a90e2cbf2b5d5fe00d
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmoneco.2021.01.001

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The Role of Regulation and Bank Competition in Small Firm Financing: Evidence from the Community Reinvestment Act

Autor: Panagiotis Avramidis, George Pennacchi, Konstantinos Serfes, Kejia Wu

Publikováno v: Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia).

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::a3bc00e82fd3b7e2c458db9a16d46f5b
https://doi.org/10.21799/frbp.wp.2022.06

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On Equilibrium When Contingent Capital Has a Market Trigger: A Correction to Sundaresan and Wang Journal of Finance (2015)

Autor: George Pennacchi, Alexei Tchistyi

Publikováno v: The Journal of Finance. 74:1559-1576

This paper identifies an error in Sundaresan and Wang (2015, hereafter SW) that invalidates its Theorem 1. The paper develops a model of contingent capital (CC) with a stock price trigger that is consistent with SW's framework and yields closed‐for

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::4c6e5593cc2d9d5db60536bbf3edd93c
https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.12762

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Syndicated Loan Risk: The Effects of Covenants and Collateral

Autor: Jianglin Dennis Ding, George Pennacchi

Publikováno v: SSRN Electronic Journal.

This paper presents a new approach that quantifies how a credit rating agency and investors judge the effects of collateral and various covenants on syndicated loan risk. It addresses firms’ self-selection of these contract terms by analyzing how a

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::5848f54ec8cadd6eb369b4f3b3706528
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3828153

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Are contingent convertibles going-concern capital?

Autor: Franco Fiordelisi, Ornella Ricci, George Pennacchi

Contingent convertibles (CoCos) are intended to either convert to new equity or be written down prior to failure while a bank is a going-concern. Yet, in the first actual test case, CoCos never converted before its bank failed. We develop a model tha

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::b0edfd972f0cf863e181ace2616215b7
https://eprints.mdx.ac.uk/26510/1/FF_GP_OR_CoCos_16Feb2019.pdf

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Contingent Convertibles with Stock Price Triggers: The Case of Perpetuities

Autor: George Pennacchi, Alexei Tchistyi

Publikováno v: The Review of Financial Studies. 32:2302-2340

Initial proposals for contingent convertibles (CoCos) envisioned that these bonds would convert to equity when the issuing bank’s stock price declined to a prespecified trigger. Subsequent research has claimed that doing so causes the stock price t

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::612da588f4bca077dca9066acda5873e
https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhy092

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Ratings-Based Regulation and Systematic Risk Incentives

Autor: Giuliano Iannotta, George Pennacchi, João A. C. Santos

Publikováno v: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal
Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (RCAAP)
instacron:RCAAP

Funding agency and sponsor: CAREFIN, University of Tennessee, University of Virginia and Institut Européen d'Administration des Affaires. Funding text: An earlier version of this paper was titled “Bank regulation, credit ratings, and systematic ri

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::176753a6f39f11a4f10987d3816efc9a
https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhy091

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Banks, Taxes, and Nonbank Competition

Autor: George Pennacchi

Publikováno v: Journal of Financial Services Research. 55:1-30

This paper models banks’ choice of capital structure and interest rates on loans and deposits when financial services markets are characterized by economies of scope, corporate taxes, and competition from nonbanks (shadow banks). In markets with ri

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::f0221f780f73b095307daf3853fbea10
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10693-017-0277-2

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