Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 63
pro vyhledávání: '"George Georgiadis"'
Autor:
Giuseppe Giordano, Evangelia Kyriazi, Charalampos Mavridis, Francesco Persico, Charalampos Fragkoulis, Piergiorgio Gatto, George Georgiadis, Irene Giagourta, Ioannis Glykas, Rodolfo Hurle, Massimo Lazzeri, Giovanni Lughezzani, Vincenzo Magnano San Lio, Charalampos Mamoulakis, Diego Meo, Helen A. Papadaki, George Piaditis, Charalampos Pontikoglou, Georgios Stathouros
Publikováno v:
Archivio Italiano di Urologia e Andrologia, Vol 93, Iss 1 (2021)
This collection of cases describes some unusual urological tumors and complications related to urological tumors and their treatment. Case 1: A case of uretero-arterial fistula in a patient with long-term ureteral stenting for ureteral oncological
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/7b7b067dfebb4b168c53d0b280d35b5a
Autor:
Charalampos Mavridis, George Georgiadis, Eleni D. Lagoudaki, Iordanis Skamagkas, Ioannis Heretis, Anastasios V. Koutsopoulos, Charalampos Mamoulakis
Publikováno v:
Case Reports in Urology, Vol 2020 (2020)
Bladder leiomyomas (BLs) are extremely rare benign tumors of mesenchymal origin. The exact pathophysiological mechanisms that lead to their appearance remain unclear including hormonal disorders, chromosomal abnormalities, and fetal remnants in the b
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/e37b76e784154436a387da00b620f06d
Autor:
Sotirios Tsiodras, Nikos Spanakis, Gregory Spanakos, Danai Pervanidou, Theano Georgakopoulou, Elsa Campos, Theofania Petra, Petros Kanellopoulos, George Georgiadis, Emmanouil Antalis, Vassileios Kontos, Lambros A. Giannopoulos, Yiannis Tselentis, Anna Papa, Athanassios Tsakris, George Saroglou
Publikováno v:
Journal of Infection and Public Health, Vol 10, Iss 6, Pp 819-823 (2017)
Human granulocytic anaplasmosis (HGA) is a tick-borne disease caused by Anaplasma phagocytophilum that has the potential to spread in new geographical areas. The first fatal case of HGA in Greece is presented. Fever of unknown origin, renal and respi
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/88620c580ecc45918eaada0e4983bae0
Akademický článek
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Publikováno v:
Games and Economic Behavior. 131:171-185
We consider a two-player game of war of attrition under complete information. It is well-known that this class of games admits equilibria in pure, as well as mixed strategies, and much of the literature has focused on the latter. We show that if the
Autor:
George Georgiadis, Michael Powell
Publikováno v:
American Economic Review. 112:267-303
This paper aims to improve the practical applicability of the classic theory of incentive contracts under moral hazard. We establish conditions under which the information provided by an A/B test of incentive contracts is sufficient for answering the
Publikováno v:
EC
We obtain optimal dynamic contests for environments where the designer monitors effort through coarse, binary signals—Poisson successes—and aims to elicit maximum effort, ideally in the least amount of time possible, given a fixed prize. The desi
Autor:
Rodolfo Hurle, Charalampos Mavridis, Giovanni Lughezzani, Georgios Stathouros, Piergiorgio Gatto, Massimo Lazzeri, Diego Meo, Charalampos Pontikoglou, Ioannis Glykas, Helen A. Papadaki, Irene Giagourta, Francesco Persico, Charalampos Mamoulakis, George Piaditis, Vincenzo Magnano San Lio, George Georgiadis, Giuseppe Giordano, Charalampos Fragkoulis, Evangelia Kyriazi
Publikováno v:
Archivio Italiano di Urologia e Andrologia, Vol 93, Iss 1 (2021)
This collection of cases describes some unusual urological tumors and complications related to urological tumors and their treatment. Case 1: A case of uretero-arterial fistula in a patient with long-term ureteral stenting for ureteral oncological st
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Theory. 209:105621
This paper considers a moral hazard model with (i) a risk-neutral agent and (ii) agent limited liability. Prior to interacting with the principal, the agent designs the production technology, which is a specification of the agent's cost of generating
Publikováno v:
Theoretical Economics. 15:715-761
Consider an agent who can costlessly add mean‐preserving noise to his output. To deter such risk‐taking, the principal optimally offers a contract that makes the agent's utility concave in output. If the agent is risk‐neutral and protected by l