Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 20
pro vyhledávání: '"Geeyoung Min"'
Autor:
Geeyoung Min1, Kwon-Yong Jin2
Publikováno v:
Brigham Young University Law Review. 2021, Vol. 47 Issue 1, p149-218. 70p.
Autor:
Hye Young You, Geeyoung Min
Publikováno v:
The Journal of Legal Studies. 48:81-116
This article reveals the positions of corporations not only as active players in politics but also as targets of activist shareholders with opposing political preferences. We examine whether a firm's political orientation, as measured by its politica
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::02e28bf88a6dcdb11527715db976e584
https://doi.org/10.1086/700846
https://doi.org/10.1086/700846
Autor:
Choi, Albert H.1 achoi@law.virginia.edu, Geeyoung Min2 geeyoung.min@gmail.com
Publikováno v:
Iowa Law Review. Nov2018, Vol. 104 Issue 1, p1-44. 44p.
Autor:
Geeyoung Min1
Publikováno v:
Journal of Corporation Law. 2017, Vol. 43 Issue 2, p289-334. 46p.
Autor:
Yong Lim1, Geeyoung Min2,3
Publikováno v:
Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business. Spring2016, Vol. 36 Issue 2, p267-301. 34p.
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
How can we ensure corporations play by the “rules of the game”—that is, laws encouraging firms to avoid socially harmful conduct? Corporate compliance programs play a central role in society’s current response. Prosecutors give firms incentiv
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::481150048a411a56bf8e7d255227c940
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3244167
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3244167
Autor:
Geeyoung Min
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
For dual-class companies, stock dividends have become a potent weapon for corporate boards to reallocate control without shareholder intervention. For example, the CBS board proposed to distribute voting stock to all shareholders to drastically dilut
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::8e6f7f5b0835ce53429172ce6849d92e
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3237752
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3237752
Autor:
Geeyoung Min
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Prior scholarship has characterized corporate charters as relatively static documents that, if ever amended, tend to serve the interests of managers over those of shareholders. This paper challenges the conventional accounts using newly constructed,
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::9fedd46e8dbfdc35790353a6acdabe4a
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2738961
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2738961