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pro vyhledávání: '"Gary E. Bolton"'
Publikováno v:
Production and Operations Management. 32:1243-1261
Publikováno v:
Management Science.
Reputation feedback systems assign feedback scores to traders with the aim of separating them according to reliability. There is now a substantial amount of literature on what these mechanisms do well and not so well. Conspicuously absent is a theore
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 191:946-964
Theoretical and empirical findings suggest that individuals are sensitive to the observability of their actions and the downstream consequences of this observability. We connect three streams of literature (social preferences, behavior change, and so
Autor:
Gary E. Bolton, Emin Karagözoğlu
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Psychology. 97:102634
Publikováno v:
Management Science. 65:5371-5391
The reputation information provided by market feedback systems tends to be compressed in the sense that reliable and unreliable sellers have similar feedback scores. The experiment presented here features a market in which what a buyer receives is a
Autor:
Elena Katok, Gary E. Bolton
Publikováno v:
Management Science. 64:1440-1457
What is the most credible way to convey the risk in expert forecasts to the nonexpert decision makers who use the forecast? We test two ways to communicate this information: provide an unequivocal recommendation or equivocate by providing the probabi
Publikováno v:
Management Science. 64(9):4009-4031
Many online markets encourage traders to make good after an unsatisfactory transaction by offering the opportunity to withdraw negative reputational feedback in a dispute resolution phase. Motivated by field evidence and guided by theoretical conside
Publikováno v:
Journal of the Economic Science Association, 2(2), 127-143. Springer
We exhibit a mechanism by which two parties leverage their social relationship to ratchet up the rents they collect from a third party residual claimant. Specifically, in a laboratory environment, we study a novel three-person insider game in which '
Autor:
Gary E. Bolton, Emin Karagözoğlu
Publikováno v:
Games and Economic Behavior
What makes a bargaining proposal credible? We study how hard leverage (binding commitment) influences soft leverage (appealing to a focal point) in a rich-context bargaining game known to exhibit competing claims to focality. In three treatments, our
Autor:
Gary E. Bolton, Peter Werner
Publikováno v:
Experimental Economics, 19(3), 535-561. Springer, Cham
We investigate how employee potential influences wage offers and effort exertion in a gift exchange experiment. In particular, we test if gift exchange based on a commonly accepted norm for wage differentiation can emerge in a setting where the wage