Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 160
pro vyhledávání: '"GOEL, SUMIT"'
Autor:
Baranski, Andrzej, Goel, Sumit
We study the classical contest design problem of allocating a budget across different prizes to maximize effort in a finite type-space environment. For any contest, we characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium. In this equilibrium, different agen
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2410.04970
Autor:
Goel, Sumit, Hann-Caruthers, Wade
We study a multi-agent contract design problem with moral hazard. In our model, each agent exerts costly effort towards an individual task at which it may either succeed or fail, and the principal, who wishes to encourage effort, has an exclusive-use
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2402.15890
Autor:
Goel, Sumit
This dissertation contains three essays. They offer contributions to the fields of mechanism design (Chapters 1 and 2) and contest theory (Chapter 3). Chapter 1, co-authored with Wade Hann-Caruthers, studies the problem of aggregating privately-held
Autor:
Goel, Sumit, Goyal, Amit
Publikováno v:
Journal of Mathematical Economics (2023)
We consider two-player contests with the possibility of ties and study the effect of different tie-breaking rules on effort. For ratio-form and difference-form contests that admit pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, we find that the effort of both player
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2304.13866
Autor:
Goel, Sumit
We study the design of effort-maximizing grading schemes between agents with private abilities. Assuming agents derive value from the information their grade reveals about their ability, we find that more informative grading schemes induce more compe
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2205.05207
Autor:
Panwar, Abhilash, Malik, Sangeeta, Kamarthi, Nagaraju, Gupta, Swati, Goel, Sumit, Sharma, Abhinav, Bhalla, Khushboo
Publikováno v:
In Pediatric Dental Journal December 2024 34(3):164-181
Autor:
Goel, Sumit, Hann-Caruthers, Wade
Publikováno v:
In Mathematical Social Sciences December 2024 132:105-113
Publikováno v:
In Journal of Economic Theory December 2024 222
We study stable allocations in an exchange economy with indivisible goods. The problem is well-known to be challenging, and rich enough to encode fundamentally unstable economies, such as the roommate problem. Our approach stems from generalizing the
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2202.04706
Autor:
Goel, Sumit, Hann-Caruthers, Wade
We consider a principal agent project selection problem with asymmetric information. There are $N$ projects and the principal must select exactly one of them. Each project provides some profit to the principal and some payoff to the agent and these p
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2007.00907