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of 22
pro vyhledávání: '"GEFFNER, IVAN"'
This paper considers the dynamics of cheap talk interactions between a sender and receiver, departing from conventional models by focusing on the receiver's perspective. We study two models, one with transparent motives and another one in which the r
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2401.03671
In this paper, we study an extension of the classic long cheap talk equilibrium introduced by Aumann and Hart~\citeN{aumann-hart-03}, and ask how much can the players benefit from having a trusted mediator compared with the standard unmediated model.
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2312.14793
Autor:
Geffner, Ivan, Halpern, Joseph Y.
Protocols for tossing a common coin play a key role in the vast majority of implementations of consensus. Even though the common coins in the literature are usually \emph{fair} (they have equal chance of landing heads or tails), we focus on the probl
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2312.14775
Autor:
Geffner, Ivan, Tennenholtz, Moshe
Nash equilibrium is often heralded as a guiding principle for rational decision-making in strategic interactions. However, it is well-known that Nash equilibrium sometimes fails as a reliable predictor of outcomes, with two of the most notable issues
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2312.14745
Autor:
Geffner, Ivan, Halpern, Joseph Y.
We consider $k$-resilient sequential equilibria, strategy profiles where no player in a coalition of at most $k$ players believes that it can increase its utility by deviating, regardless of its local state. We prove that all $k$-resilient sequential
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2309.14618
Publikováno v:
EPTCS 379, 2023, pp. 31-45
In an information aggregation game, a set of senders interact with a receiver through a mediator. Each sender observes the state of the world and communicates a message to the mediator, who recommends an action to the receiver based on the messages r
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2307.05054
We study an information design problem with two informed senders and a receiver in which, in contrast to traditional Bayesian persuasion settings, senders do not have commitment power. In our setting, a trusted mediator/platform gathers data from the
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2211.14670
Autor:
Geffner, Ivan, Halpern, Joseph Y.
Publikováno v:
In Journal of Economic Theory October 2024 221
Autor:
GEFFNER, IVAN1 ieg8@cornell.edu, HALPERN, JOSEPH Y.1 halpern@cs.cornell.edu
Publikováno v:
Journal of the ACM. Apr2023, Vol. 70 Issue 2, p1-21. 21p.
Autor:
Geffner, Ivan, Halpern, Joseph Y.
Abraham, Dolev, Geffner, and Halpern proved that, in asynchronous systems, a $(k,t)$-robust equilibrium for $n$ players and a trusted mediator can be implemented without the mediator as long as $n > 4(k+t)$, where an equilibrium is $(k,t)$-robust if,
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2104.02759