Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 27
pro vyhledávání: '"Günter Strobl"'
Autor:
Simon Gervais, Günter Strobl
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Autor:
Daniel Dornand, Günter Strobl
Publikováno v:
Journal of Banking & Finance. 153:106858
The disposition effect is a longstanding puzzle in financial economics. This paper demonstrates that it is not intrinsically at odds with rational behavior. In a rational expectations model with asymmetrically informed investors, trading strategies a
Autor:
Günter Strobl, Simon Gervais
Publikováno v:
The Review of Financial Studies. 33:3889-3924
We construct and analyze a model of delegated portfolio management in which money managers signal their investment skills via their choice of transparency for their fund. We show that a natural equilibrium is one in which high- and low-skill managers
Autor:
Günter Strobl
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control. 138:104326
The abstract is available here: https://uscholar.univie.ac.at/o:1628908
Autor:
Günter Strobl, Paul Povel
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
We show that firms may benefit from allowing some earnings management, because it can make noisy signals more informative. We model a firm that cannot observe a manager's cost of effort, her effort choice, and whether she manipulated a publicly obser
Autor:
Günter Strobl
Publikováno v:
Journal of Corporate Finance. 29:594-606
This paper investigates the relationship among a firm's managerial incentive scheme, the informativeness of its stock price, and its investment policy. It shows that the shareholders' concerns about the effectiveness of stock-based compensation can l
Publikováno v:
Review of Financial Studies. 27:484-518
This paper develops a dynamic rational expectations model of the credit rating process, incorporating three critical elements of this industry: (i) the rating agencies’ ability to misreport the issuer’s credit quality, (ii) their ability to issue
Publikováno v:
Management Science. 59:918-932
In most employment relationships, the employee's performance at the firm is privately, not publicly, observed. Firms can reward successful employees by publicizing their abilities, for example, via a job title, a glowing letter of recommendation, or
Autor:
Günter Strobl
Publikováno v:
Journal of Accounting Research. 51:449-473
The widespread use of accounting information by investors and financial analysts to help value stocks creates an incentive for managers to manipulate earnings in an attempt to influence short-term stock price performance. This paper examines the role
Autor:
Eitan Goldman, Günter Strobl
Publikováno v:
Journal of Financial Intermediation. 22:106-122
This paper investigates how the presence of a large institutional shareholder affects the complexity of corporate investments. Our analysis is based on the observation that the blockholder’s planning horizon does not necessarily coincide with the t