Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 40
pro vyhledávání: '"Fuhai Hong"'
Autor:
Dong ZHANG, Fuhai Hong
Publikováno v:
Public Choice.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::528f0df80ab80751355a2b4f2ac4ce14
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-022-01003-2
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-022-01003-2
Publikováno v:
Theory and Decision. 93:151-184
Social identity is embedded in social structures, generated by various social processes, and has multiple dimensions. We report findings from a laboratory experiment eliciting two-dimensional social identities: a horizontal identity determined either
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::2c7e4b85e578c0ebc14395d6623b0465
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-021-09834-z
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-021-09834-z
Publikováno v:
Social Choice and Welfare. 57:617-664
Agents’ decision whether to join a group, and their subsequent contribution to a public good, depend on the group’s ideals. Agents have different preference for this public good, e.g. reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. People who become “c
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::c395c0ea003a39f59f94e30384a6a9f1
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-021-01322-1
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-021-01322-1
Autor:
Zhendong Yin, Fuhai Hong
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 180:1-23
This paper studies the government’s organizational structure with petty corruption. We investigate whether the government should centralize or separate the power of granting business permits if bureaucrats may engage in collusion or/and extortion.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::2985a2767afcb7dbb384a59a6700f694
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2020.09.008
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2020.09.008
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::063ff5415a78948d12c9db2e3757ec66
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4219865
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4219865
Autor:
Nori Tarui, Fuhai Hong
Publikováno v:
The Singapore Economic Review. 65:551-553
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::9a719aead8a863a0a64fe30d35fdfd35
https://doi.org/10.1142/s0217590820020014
https://doi.org/10.1142/s0217590820020014
Publikováno v:
Experimental Economics. 23:815-847
This paper is the first to use the WeChat platform, one of the largest social networks, to conduct an online experiment of artificial investment games. We investigate how people’s forecasts about the financial market and investment decisions are sh
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::bf7eee962e9c67eab152246cb3e5de8c
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-019-09632-z
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-019-09632-z
Autor:
Zhendong Yin, Fuhai Hong
Publikováno v:
Journal of Public Economic Theory. 21:1074-1106
This paper analyzes the optimal allocation of antibribery resources when bribery type is endogenously determined by corrupt bureaucrats. A firm is supposed to invest to get licenses for production from bureaucrats. The bureaucrat commits to a bribes
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::c89390f855032b8f6ff836b543d43999
https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12399
https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12399
Autor:
Fuhai Hong, Tat-How Teh
Publikováno v:
Environmental and Resource Economics. 74:505-538
Bureaucratic shirking and corruption are prevalent in developing countries. This paper presents a delegation model where a government authorizes an inspector to monitor a polluting firm. The inspector may shirk in monitoring and may accept bribery wh
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::29a3320acc1764ee1f95b8edd504b7c6
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-019-00327-w
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-019-00327-w
Publikováno v:
International Economic Review. 59:511-536
A well-recognized problem in the multitasking literature is that workers might substantially reduce their effort on tasks that produce unobservable outputs as they seek the salient rewards to observable outputs. Since the theory related to multitaski
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::eef185a94e5078c791bbc8b42c9abdb9
https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12278
https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12278