Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 94
pro vyhledávání: '"Friedel Bolle"'
Autor:
Friedel Bolle
Publikováno v:
Games, Vol 12, Iss 2, p 41 (2021)
The main goal of collective punishment (CP) is the deterrence of future “wrong-doing” by freedom fighters or terrorists, protesters against an authoritative government, polluters, students playing pranks on their teacher, football teams lacking e
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/7a4e9d2b59da4f4e80d9504c1e608c6d
Autor:
Philipp E. Otto, Friedel Bolle
Publikováno v:
Social Choice and Welfare. 58:711-740
When including outside pressure on voters as individual costs, sequential voting (as in roll call votes) is theoretically preferable to simultaneous voting (as in recorded ballots). Under complete information, sequential voting has a unique subgame p
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::ad71b6154ad4b67334cf151d885af2c9
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-021-01371-6
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-021-01371-6
Autor:
Friedel Bolle, Philipp E. Otto
Publikováno v:
Public Choice. 190:75-92
In random voting, the committee chair, whose vote decides in the case of a draw, is more often decisive than ordinary voters. Therefore, in the power indices literature, the committee chair is said to be more powerful. Players with a veto right are e
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::c6f4c9c9a980bfc64c45e21427ff880a
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-021-00916-8
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-021-00916-8
Autor:
Friedel Bolle
Publikováno v:
Journal of Public Economic Theory. 24:30-57
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::8f19871182349fc058669e9791e0e7ba
https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12537
https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12537
Autor:
Jonathan H. W. Tan, Friedel Bolle
Publikováno v:
Journal of the Economic Science Association. 7:49-63
Cooperation motives are traditionally elicited in experimental games where players have misaligned interests that yield noncooperation in equilibrium. Research finds a typology of behavioral types such as free riders and conditional cooperators. Howe
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::6bf764072d19682d6c5c478f6b7f8053
https://doi.org/10.1007/s40881-021-00101-z
https://doi.org/10.1007/s40881-021-00101-z
Autor:
Jonathan HW Tan, Friedel Bolle
Publikováno v:
Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics. :102034
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::5c7b952424f0b2ce15f477a43d9fd852
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2023.102034
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2023.102034
Autor:
Friedel Bolle, Philipp E. Otto
Publikováno v:
Economics & Sociology. 13:11-30
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::5972fcb8ec041c6572f6bfd30b7c2227
https://doi.org/10.14254/2071-789x.2020/13-4/1
https://doi.org/10.14254/2071-789x.2020/13-4/1
Autor:
Friedel Bolle
Publikováno v:
Mathematical Social Sciences. 102:24-34
The true preferences of some members of parliament sometimes imply voting against the party line, but these members fear sanctions. In the mostly unique pure strategy equilibrium of such a voting game, voters always follow the party line, even if the
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::c5c0c6b5563b50d1be19cf62717e14ba
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2019.09.001
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2019.09.001