Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 25
pro vyhledávání: '"Frauke von Bieberstein"'
Publikováno v:
PLoS ONE, Vol 16, Iss 8, p e0255071 (2021)
Indirect reciprocity has been proposed to explain prosocial behavior among strangers, whereby the prosocial act is returned by a third party. However, what happens if the prosocial act cannot be observed by the third party? Here, we examine whether e
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/35fabe09b83644b19442b874ba264543
Publikováno v:
Essl, Andrea; von Bieberstein, Frauke; Kosfeld, Michael; Kröll, Markus (2023). Social preferences and sales performance (In Press). Journal of economics & management strategy Wiley 10.1111/jems.12523
We use an incentivized experimental game to uncover heterogeneity in social preferences among salespeople in a large Austrian retail chain. Our results show that the majority of agents take the welfare of others into account but a significant fractio
Publikováno v:
Die Unternehmung. 76:293-297
Publikováno v:
Essl, Andrea; Friedrich, Kathrin; Schumacher, Stefanie; von Bieberstein, Frauke (2023). Penalty contracts: is it all about paying the cash upfront? Review of Managerial Science Springer 10.1007/s11846-022-00617-6
We experimentally investigate the relevance of a cash upfront payment for the effort-enhancing effect of penalty contracts. We find that penalty contracts where participants receive the upfront payment physically before working on a real effort task
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::ec58d861346abbfcd65badcdc7be3a94
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Publikováno v:
Academy of Management Proceedings. 2022
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 175:251-277
The present research examines gender differences in challenge-seeking behavior in different work environments. We address the bottom end of the job spectrum with typical low-skill entry-level jobs, where the willingness to embrace new challenges is a
Publikováno v:
Family Business Review. 33:265-283
Stakeholder honesty is highly important for managers, for instance, in decisions involving hiring. Due to reciprocity, stakeholders are more likely to be honest if the managers act honestly themselves. However, external stakeholders often cannot obse
Publikováno v:
Managerial and Decision Economics. 41:651-657
This paper examines reputation as motive for lying aversion. In a control treatment, participants roll a six‐sided die and report the outcome, which the experimenter cannot observe. In a digital die treatment, the outcome of the die roll is determi
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.