Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 21
pro vyhledávání: '"Frank Huettner"'
Autor:
Frank Huettner, Dominik Karos
Publikováno v:
Studies in Choice and Welfare ISBN: 9783031216954
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::56c57f1d635b643796ea5ab900159fd3
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-21696-1_12
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-21696-1_12
Publikováno v:
Operations Research. 67:671-699
Consumers often do not have complete information about the choices they face and, therefore, have to spend time and effort acquiring information. Because information acquisition is costly, consumers trade off the value of better information against i
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::4bc4c8d2995269c679f8fa121b9ba54d
https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2018.1828
https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2018.1828
Autor:
André Casajus, Frank Huettner
Publikováno v:
Public Choice. 181:275-289
The Coleman power of a collectivity to act (CPCA) is a popular statistic that reflects the ability of a committee to pass a proposal. Applying the Shapley value to that measure, we derive a new power index—the Coleman–Shapley index (CSI)—indica
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::7f130d7ec6b34888fc40938254c69032
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-019-00654-y
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-019-00654-y
Autor:
André Casajus, Frank Huettner
Publikováno v:
Economics Letters. 164:27-30
The resolution of a solution for cooperative games is a recently developed tool to decompose a solution into a player’s direct contribution in a game and her (higher-order) indirect contribution, i.e., her contribution to other players’ direct co
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::4ed2cdc3ac4dfa7545f7680d1e26054f
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.12.011
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.12.011
Autor:
André Casajus, Frank Huettner
Publikováno v:
Games and Economic Behavior. 108:37-48
We suggest foundations for the Shapley value and for the naive solution, which assigns to any player the difference between the worth of the grand coalition and its worth after this player left the game. To this end, we introduce the decomposition of
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::4da310328bc3ab7fcd51ef5ce22f7a71
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.05.001
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.05.001
Autor:
Frank Huettner, André Casajus
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
In the absence of externalities, marginality is equivalent to an independence property that rests on Harsanyi‘s dividends. These dividends identify the surplus inherent to each coalition. Independence states that a player‘s payoff stays the same
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::8ee77e1b22a3f0a977e2a3c3f2e37293
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3394800
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3394800
Publikováno v:
Economics Letters. 146:103-106
We study values for TU games with a communication graph (CO-values). In particular, we show that CO-values for connected graphs that are fair and efficient allow for a unique efficient and fair extension to the full domain.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::6dca007edb701ed7f59ad5ec7036a8fc
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.07.030
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.07.030
Autor:
André Casajus, Frank Huettner
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
The Coleman Power of the Collectivity to Act (CPCA) is a popular statistic that reflects the ability of a committee to pass a proposal. Applying the Shapley value to this measure, we derive a new power index that indicates each voter's contribution t
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::90bc3037fda28edc03b073f8a7dc298f
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3175209
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3175209
Autor:
Frank Huettner, André Casajus
Publikováno v:
European Journal of Operational Research. 236:583-591
We suggest a new one-parameter family of solidarity values for TU-games. The members of this class are distinguished by the type of player whose removal from a game does not
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::51ac9fb459003ab1e6d4d2ece9903218
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2013.12.015
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2013.12.015
Autor:
Frank Huettner
Publikováno v:
Theory and Decision. 78:273-287
We introduce a solution concept for cooperative games with transferable utility and a coalition structure that is proportional for two-player games. Our value is obtained from generalizing a proportional value for cooperative games with transferable
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::741776cabf3b036923295bd81b1c298c
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-014-9420-9
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-014-9420-9