Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 23
pro vyhledávání: '"Francisco Ruiz-Aliseda"'
Autor:
Gastón Llanes, Francisco Ruiz‐Aliseda
Publikováno v:
The RAND Journal of Economics. 52:815-838
Autor:
Francisco Ruiz-Aliseda
Publikováno v:
The Journal of Industrial Economics. 67:279-327
Using a two‐period model, I show that competition between two symmetric duopolists trying to learn about unknown features of demand results in an informationally suboptimal process. Because a firm’s marginal return to price experimentation equals
We study whether complementarities can help a firm enter a market with strong network effects and incumbency advantages. We find that bundling the network good with a complementary good, or using the network good as a loss leader (i.e., pricing below
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::01768e9d58aecad96e744d33b105ed47
http://hdl.handle.net/11585/709377
http://hdl.handle.net/11585/709377
Publikováno v:
Management Science. 64:2716-2733
The new perspective emerging from strategy’s value-capture stream is that the effects of competition are twofold: competition for an agent bounds its performance from below, while that for its transaction partners bounds from above. Thus, assessing
Autor:
Francisco Ruiz-Aliseda
Publikováno v:
Economics Letters. 181:208-210
I consider the classical oligopoly game in which firms choose prices or quantities at the same time each chooses an innovation effort that directly establishes its (constant) marginal cost of production. I show how this game can be viewed as complete
Autor:
Francisco Ruiz-Aliseda
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Industrial Organization. 47:121-151
In a two-period duopoly setting in which switching costs are the only reason why products may be perceived as differentiated, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for switching costs to lead to higher prices in the first period as well as t
Autor:
Francisco Ruiz-Aliseda
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Industrial Organization. 44:123-137
We present a continuous-time game in which two firms must decide at each instant of time whether to be in or out of a market that expands up to a random maturity date and declines thereafter. Firms are initially inactive, and they differ only in the
Autor:
Emeric Henry, Francisco Ruiz-Aliseda
Publikováno v:
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, 2016, 8 (3), pp.95-118. ⟨10.1257/mic.20140190⟩
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 8(3), 95-118 (2016-08)
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, 2016, 8 (3), pp.95-118. ⟨10.1257/mic.20140190⟩
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 8(3), 95-118 (2016-08)
Keeping valuable secrets requires costly protection efforts. Breaking them requires costly search efforts. In a dynamic model in which the value of the secret decreases with the number of those holding it, we examine the secret holders' protection de
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::1bd7064d39d7351d135ec13d4b259080
https://hal-sciencespo.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03579719
https://hal-sciencespo.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03579719
Publikováno v:
Annals of Finance. 7:171-198
The real options literature has provided new insights on how to manage irreversible capital investments whose payoffs are uncertain. Two of the most important predictions from such theory are: (i) greater risk delays a firm’s investment timing, and
In industries with large sunk costs, the investment strategy of competing fi rms depends on the regulatory context. We consider ex-ante industrial policies in which the sunk cost may be either taxed or subsidized, and antitrust policies which could b
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dedup_wf_001::2c3dee54a4e359437a7444e852cbcaab
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01117091
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01117091