Zobrazeno 1 - 6
of 6
pro vyhledávání: '"Francis X. Flanagan"'
Autor:
Francis X. Flanagan
Publikováno v:
The Journal of Law and Economics. 61:189-214
This paper uses data from felony jury trials in North Carolina to show that the race and gender composition of the randomly selected jury pool has a significant effect on the probability of...
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::9159fd6827d26ade34b79c684b98cac0
https://doi.org/10.1086/698193
https://doi.org/10.1086/698193
Publikováno v:
Social Choice and Welfare. 50:581-596
We study mechanisms for allocating objects to pairs of agents when agents may have nontrivial preferences over objects and pairings. In this environment, the mechanism may distort agents’ preferences over pairings. Compared to certain distortive me
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::b9103a1eac15e6079e44ae44e6dcb23e
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-017-1097-x
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-017-1097-x
Autor:
Francis X. Flanagan
Publikováno v:
The Journal of Law and Economics. 58:385-416
I examine how peremptory challenges, which are vetoes that attorneys may use to reject prospective jurors, affect jury composition. The purpose of peremptory challenges is to eliminate biased jurors; however, I show that under the two most common rul
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::b09eb1b296b62a20606bfb5e748ff90c
https://doi.org/10.1086/684040
https://doi.org/10.1086/684040
Autor:
Francis X. Flanagan
Publikováno v:
Journal of Mathematical Economics. 53:106-110
In the many-to-one matching model with contracts, I show that there is no restriction on preferences weaker than substitutable preferences which guarantees that the set of stable allocations is a lattice. Thus, when contracts are not substitutes, rem
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::36c641e841492247e52a2549d61c12e0
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2014.06.005
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2014.06.005
Autor:
Francis X. Flanagan
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Game Theory. 44:209-223
I introduce a general many-to-one matching framework which includes the matching with contracts model as well as models of matching with preferences over colleagues as special cases. I show that this general model can be embedded into the model with
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::4a3e4ce836724738a7ca4f916f8d93ea
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-014-0426-x
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-014-0426-x
Autor:
Francis X. Flanagan
Publikováno v:
Economics Letters. 123:113-117
In the many-to-one matching model with contracts, I provide new necessary and new sufficient conditions for the existence of a stable allocation. These new conditions exploit the fact that one side of the market has strict preferences over individual
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::105c6d59e680600a59bde62a993317db
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.01.040
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.01.040