Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 26
pro vyhledávání: '"Francesc Llerena"'
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::d07146907c85d018d4cf1b34ee134b3a
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4382675
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4382675
Autor:
Pedro Calleja, Francesc Llerena
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::ca25c83ad211fe1a5b308685e24329b3
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4350708
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4350708
Publikováno v:
Dipòsit Digital de la UB
Universidad de Barcelona
Calleja, P, Llerena, F & Sudhölter, P 2021, ' Constrained welfare egalitarianism in surplus-sharing problems ', Mathematical Social Sciences, vol. 109, no. January, pp. 45-51 . https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2020.10.006
Universidad de Barcelona
Calleja, P, Llerena, F & Sudhölter, P 2021, ' Constrained welfare egalitarianism in surplus-sharing problems ', Mathematical Social Sciences, vol. 109, no. January, pp. 45-51 . https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2020.10.006
We introduce the constrained egalitarian surplus-sharing rule fCE, which distributes an amount of a divisible resource so that the poorer agents’ resulting payoffs become equal but not larger than any remaining agent’s status quo payoff. We show
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::f76782befe4c98321bb0527382903e9e
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2020.10.006
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2020.10.006
Autor:
Pedro Calleja, Francesc Llerena
Publikováno v:
Economics Letters. 221:110921
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::2599948c32703588fb87d9b2c934fc9a
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110921
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110921
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::077576479ad02c2b3701083a2cf08b61
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4024220
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4024220
Autor:
Pedro Calleja, Francesc Llerena
Publikováno v:
Dipòsit Digital de la UB
Universidad de Barcelona
Universidad de Barcelona
The Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) has been axiomatically characterized from different points of view. van den Brink (2001) proposes a characterization by means of efficiency, fairness and the null player property. In this paper, we characterize the f
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::a35e641b48983e66fca13a0d06c9d8eb
http://hdl.handle.net/2445/159858
http://hdl.handle.net/2445/159858
Autor:
Francesc Llerena, Pedro Calleja
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Game Theory. 48:287-310
On the domain of cooperative games with transferable utility, we introduce path monotonicity, a property closely related to fairness (van den Brink, in Int J Game Theory 30:309–319, 2001). The principle of fairness states that if a game changes by
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::0da4a502f2c8198fb185364d07d13878
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-019-00661-9
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-019-00661-9
Autor:
Francesc Llerena, Llúcia Mauri
Publikováno v:
Mathematical Social Sciences. 89:92-99
A class of balanced games, called exact partition games, is introduced. Within this class, it is shown that the egalitarian solution of Dutta and Ray (1989) behaves as in the class of convex games. Moreover, we provide two axiomatic characterizations
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::469feeb852ce40eae3d81e1a717b09bd
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.07.002
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.07.002
Publikováno v:
Calleja, P, Llerena, F & Sudhölter, P 2021, ' Axiomatizations of Dutta-Ray's egalitarian solution on the domain of convex games ', Journal of Mathematical Economics, vol. 95, 102477 . https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102477
Dipòsit Digital de la UB
Universidad de Barcelona
Dipòsit Digital de la UB
Universidad de Barcelona
We show that on the domain of convex games, Dutta-Ray’s egalitarian solution is characterized by core selection, aggregate monotonicity, and bounded richness, a new property requiring that the poorest players cannot be made richer within the core.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::c3eb964da5e186eaf68d31411b5c713e
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3577521
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3577521
Publikováno v:
Dipòsit Digital de la UB
Universidad de Barcelona
Calleja, P, Llerena, F & Sudholter, P 2020, ' Monotonicity and Weighted Prenucleoli : A Characterization without Consistency ', Mathematics of Operations Research, vol. 45, no. 3, pp. 1056-1068 . https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2019.1022
Universidad de Barcelona
Calleja, P, Llerena, F & Sudholter, P 2020, ' Monotonicity and Weighted Prenucleoli : A Characterization without Consistency ', Mathematics of Operations Research, vol. 45, no. 3, pp. 1056-1068 . https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2019.1022
A solution on a set of transferable utility (TU) games satisfies strong aggregate monotonicity (SAM) if every player can improve when the grand coalition becomes richer. It satisfies equal surplus division (ESD) if the solution allows the players to
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::e69ac13e3330129876889c297ee150c3
http://hdl.handle.net/2445/171456
http://hdl.handle.net/2445/171456