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pro vyhledávání: '"Frances M. Tice"'
Autor:
Frances M. Tice
Publikováno v:
Management Science.
I examine the effect of relative performance evaluation (RPE) on firm performance and risk-taking behavior. Agency theory suggests that, for firms that experience common shocks, RPE in executive compensation plans improves risk sharing and strengthen
Publikováno v:
Management Science. 66:3361-3388
This study examines the effect of audit committee connectedness through director networks on financial reporting quality, specifically the misstatement of annual financial statements. Using network analysis, we examine multiple dimensions of connecte
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Goodwill impairment rules compel managers to convey their fair value assessments to investors. Several academic studies conclude that managers, on average, take advantage of discretion under these rules to opportunistically avoid or recognize smaller
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Evidence shows that managers’ debt-like compensation (i.e., inside debt) aligns their incentives with lenders’, reducing the agency cost of debt. We examine how changes in the contracting environment affect the use of inside debt in debt contract
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
In this paper, we examine how firms choose their lobbying participation given the competitive advantages that can be gained from: (1) firm-specific attributes in the form of differentiation, (2) specificity of tax laws under which firms operate, (3)
Autor:
Frances M. Tice
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
This study examines the effect of relative performance evaluation (RPE) on managers’ investment decisions and firm performance. Principal-agent theory suggests that RPE use in CEO compensation plans can improve incentive alignment when firm perform
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
This study examines the effect of board of director connectedness on financial reporting quality, specifically the misstatement of annual financial statements. Because restatements are costly, it is important to understand whether firms with well-con
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Results have been mixed regarding whether, and how much, board of director connectedness is beneficial to firm value. Some prior research shows that overly busy directors are ineffective monitors, but these same “busy” directors can be valuable s