Tenable threats when Nash equilibrium is the norm

Autor: Jozsef Sakovics, Françoise Forges

Publikováno v: Forges, F & Sakovics, J 2022, ' Tenable threats when Nash Equilibrium is the norm ', International Journal of Game Theory, vol. 51, no. 3-4, pp. 589-605 . https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-022-00806-3

We formally assume that players in a game consider Nash Equilibrium (NE) the behavioral norm. In finite games of perfect information this leads to a refinement of NE: Faithful Nash Equilibrium (FNE). FNE is outcome equivalent to NE of the trimmed gam

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::29df131b8ecd1ff019c6eeb8399ac907
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-022-00806-3

Strategic information transmission with sender's approval

Autor: Françoise Forges, Jérôme Renault

Publikováno v: International Journal of Game Theory
International Journal of Game Theory, In press, 50 (2), ⟨10.1007/s00182-021-00757-1⟩
International Journal of Game Theory, Springer Verlag, In press, 50 (2), ⟨10.1007/s00182-021-00757-1⟩
International Journal of Game Theory, Springer Verlag, In press, ⟨10.1007/s00182-021-00757-1⟩

We consider sender–receiver games in which the sender has finitely many types and the receiver makes a decision in a compact set. The new feature is that, after the cheap talk phase, the receiver makes a proposal to the sender, which the latter can

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::c30a867a84ab1c7dd643d29bc313da75
https://hal.science/hal-02440627

Sender-receiver games with cooperation

Autor: Françoise Forges, Ulrich Horst

Publikováno v: Journal of Mathematical Economics
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, 2018, 76, ⟨10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.03.002⟩

International audience; We consider generalized sender–receiver games in which the sender also has an action to choose, but this action is payoff-relevant only to himself. We study “cooperate and talk” equilibria (CTE) in which, before sending

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::4dbd54f0f85fff5f64bfa1f718fce5cf
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02313962

Coopération en information incomplète: quelques modèles stratégiques

Autor: Françoise Forges

Publikováno v: Revue d'économie politique
Revue d'économie politique, 2017, 127 (4), ⟨10.3917/redp.274.0467⟩

Starting from a Bayesian game which accounts for the agents’ interaction in absence of any cooperation agreement, we survey some scenarios which enable the players to commit to decisions. We compare the effects of these scenarios and suggest some l

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::5c3bc0a38304327b951bd391fd3f8dd1
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02315008

Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: The two-player case

Autor: Françoise Forges, Péter Vida

Publikováno v: Theoretical Economics. 8:95-123

We show that essentially every communication equilibrium of any finite Bayesian game with two players can be implemented as a strategic form correlated equilibrium of an extended game, in which before choosing actions as in the Bayesian game, the pla

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::147a96eff30d78f3e010f3a58f695d89
https://doi.org/10.3982/te944