The Positive Argument Against Scientific Realism

Autor: Florian J. Boge

Publikováno v: Journal for General Philosophy of Science.

Putnam coined what is now known as the no miracles argument “[t]he positive argument for realism”. In its opposition, he put an argument that by his own standards counts as negative. But are there no positive arguments against scientific realism?

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::1bfff1e652396a4a804af4d96ff6f72a
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-022-09636-z

Two Dimensions of Opacity and the Deep Learning Predicament

Autor: Florian J. Boge

Publikováno v: Minds and Machines. 32:43-75

Deep neural networks (DNNs) have become increasingly successful in applications from biology to cosmology to social science. Trained DNNs, moreover, correspond to models that ideally allow the prediction of new phenomena. Building in part on the lite

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::94b2affa7f2cc5c4c86393e196134902
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-021-09569-4

Polycratic hierarchies and networks: what simulation-modeling at the LHC can teach us about the epistemology of simulation

Autor: Christian Zeitnitz, Florian J. Boge

Publikováno v: Synthese : an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science 445(1/2), 445-480 (2020). doi:10.1007/s11229-020-02667-3 special issue: "Computational Modeling in Philosophy"

Synthese : an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science (2020). doi:10.1007/s11229-020-02667-3
Published by Springer Science + Business Media B.V, Dordrecht [u.a.]

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::9bee0cb22e3eb6470933816038a4afaf
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02667-3

Correction to : Why computer simulations are not inferences, and in what sense they are experiments

Autor: Florian J. Boge

Publikováno v: European journal for philosophy of science 12(4), 70 (2022). doi:10.1007/s13194-022-00501-w

European journal for philosophy of science 12(4), 70 (2022). doi:10.1007/s13194-022-00501-w
Published by Springer, Berlin ; Heidelberg

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::1d4075f857f8f5384a5136b7626f5bb5

Is the Reality Criterion Analytic?

Autor: Florian J. Boge, David Glick

Publikováno v: Erkenntnis. 86:1445-1451

Tim Maudlin has claimed that EPR’s Reality Criterion is analytically true. We argue that it is not. Moreover, one may be a subjectivist about quantum probabilities without giving up on objective physical reality. Thus, would-be detractors must reje

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::359e82b347d5cfe90197a7661962d32e
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-019-00163-w