Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 15
pro vyhledávání: '"Florent Flament"'
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Reconfigurable Computing, Vol 2012 (2012)
Side channel and fault injection attacks are major threats to cryptographic applications of embedded systems. Best performances for these attacks are achieved by focusing sensors or injectors on the sensible parts of the application, by means of dedi
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/0cb03a0085e44b0eb715c6dc0107af50
Autor:
Laurent Sauvage, Maxime Nassar, Sylvain Guilley, Florent Flament, Jean-Luc Danger, Yves Mathieu
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Reconfigurable Computing, Vol 2010 (2010)
FPGA design of side-channel analysis countermeasures using unmasked dual-rail with precharge logic appears to be a great challenge. Indeed, the robustness of such a solution relies on careful differential placement and routing whereas both FPGA layou
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/1ced2e3eda574016927792d179e66295
Autor:
Naofumi Homma, Jean-Luc Danger, Olivier Meynard, Denis Réal, Sylvain Guilley, Florent Flament
Publikováno v:
DATE
SPA/SEMA (Simple Power/Electro-magnetic Analysis) attacks performed on public-key cryptographic modules implemented on FPGA platforms are well known from the theoretical point of view. However, the practical aspect is not often developed in the liter
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::ce3b02bc1116687b8235e04f69cfc2f7
https://doi.org/10.1109/date.2011.5763163
https://doi.org/10.1109/date.2011.5763163
Autor:
Florent Flament, Frédéric Valette, Jean-Luc Danger, Olivier Meynard, Sylvain Guilley, Denis Réal
Publikováno v:
Information Security and Cryptology ISBN: 9783642215179
Inscrypt
Inscrypt
In this article, we propose a new approach to characterize the EM leakage of electronic devices by identifying and focusing on the signals' frequencies leaking the most information. We introduce a set of tests based on cryptanalysis methods that will
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::11e5e6b972921c6c97a2d13353c6809c
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-21518-6_33
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-21518-6_33
Publikováno v:
Information Security and Cryptology-ICISC 2010 ISBN: 9783642242083
ICISC
ICISC
Side Channel Analysis (SCA) are of great concern since they have shown their efficiency in retrieving sensitive information from secure devices. In this paper we introduce First Principal Components Analysis (FPCA) which consists in evaluating the re
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::6ee5926178ea38fa7cb86efadfab12ca
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-24209-0_27
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-24209-0_27
Autor:
Shivam Bhasin, Jean-Luc Danger, Hervé Chabanne, Florent Flament, Zouha Cherif, Sylvain Guilley
Publikováno v:
ReConFig
White-box implementations of cryptographic algorithms aim to denying the key readout even if the source code embedding the key is disclosed. They are based on sets of large tables perfectly known by the user but including unknown encoding functions.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::2da09c5d561bbd56583e8d70ff921b99
https://doi.org/10.1109/reconfig.2010.36
https://doi.org/10.1109/reconfig.2010.36
Publikováno v:
ReConFig
Side channel and fault injection attacks are a major threat to cryptographic applications of embedded systems. Best performances for these attacks are achieved by focusing sensors or injectors on the sensible parts of the application, by means of ded
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::df802b2002a695b9a2119551c322c4e0
https://doi.org/10.1109/reconfig.2010.75
https://doi.org/10.1109/reconfig.2010.75
Publikováno v:
WESS
Wave Dynamic Differential Logic (WDDL) is a hiding countermeasure to thrawt side channel attacks (SCA). It suffers from a vulnerability called Early Evaluation, i.e. calculating output before all inputs are valid. This causes delay biases in WDDL eve
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::961e132128ee8db1bba44171f5339fc9
https://doi.org/10.1145/1873548.1873554
https://doi.org/10.1145/1873548.1873554
Publikováno v:
HOST
Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust
Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust, Jun 2010, Anaheim, CA, United States. pp.1-6, ⟨10.1109/HST.2010.5513124⟩
Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust
Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust, Jun 2010, Anaheim, CA, United States. pp.1-6, ⟨10.1109/HST.2010.5513124⟩
Corrected version (in particular, we noted explicitely that it is strange that the MIA -- with the limited amount of traces we process -- do fail...); International audience; Recent works have shown that the mutual information is a generic side-chann
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::82a16803e3952c09b5aaca005d6b9de2
https://doi.org/10.1109/hst.2010.5513124
https://doi.org/10.1109/hst.2010.5513124
Autor:
Florent Flament, Jean-Luc Danger, Maxime Nassar, Tarik Graba, Shivam Bhasin, Yves Mathieu, Laurent Sauvage, Sylvain Guilley, Nidhal Selmane
Publikováno v:
International Conference on ReConFigurable Computing and FPGAs
ReConFig
ReConFig, Dec 2009, Cancún, Mexico. pp.213-218, ⟨10.1109/ReConFig.2009.50⟩
ReConFig
ReConFig, Dec 2009, Cancún, Mexico. pp.213-218, ⟨10.1109/ReConFig.2009.50⟩
The main challenge when implementing cryptographic algorithms in hardware is to protect them against attacks that target directly the device. Two strategies are customarily employed by malevolent adversaries: observation and differential perturbation
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::61f19f816069061c5bcaeecfae888a52
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00411843v3/document
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00411843v3/document