Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 145
pro vyhledávání: '"Fleiner, Tamás"'
As a common generalization of previously solved optimization problems concerning bipartite stable matchings, we describe a strongly polynomial network flow based algorithm for computing $\ell$ disjoint stable matchings with minimum total cost. The ma
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2409.04885
We study housing markets as introduced by Shapley and Scarf (1974). We investigate the computational complexity of various questions regarding the situation of an agent $a$ in a housing market $H$: we show that it is $\mathsf{NP}$-hard to find an all
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2110.06875
We tackle the problem of partitioning players into groups of fixed size, such as allocating eligible students to shared dormitory rooms. Each student submits preferences over the other individual students. We study several settings, which differ in t
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1901.06737
Efficient computability is an important property of solution concepts in matching markets. We consider the computational complexity of finding and verifying various solution concepts in trading networks-multi-sided matching markets with bilateral con
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1805.08758
Autor:
Fleiner, Tamás1,2 (AUTHOR), Jankó, Zsuzsanna2,3 (AUTHOR), Schlotter, Ildikó1,2 (AUTHOR), Teytelboym, Alexander4 (AUTHOR) alexander.teytelboym@economics.ox.ac.uk
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Game Theory. Sep2023, Vol. 52 Issue 3, p629-648. 20p.
Autor:
Cseh, Ágnes, Fleiner, Tamás
An unceasing problem of our prevailing society is the fair division of goods. The problem of proportional cake cutting focuses on dividing a heterogeneous and divisible resource, the cake, among $n$ players who value pieces according to their own mea
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1709.03152
We consider a model of matching in trading networks in which firms can enter into bilateral contracts. In trading networks, stable outcomes, which are immune to deviations of arbitrary sets of firms, may not exist. We define a new solution concept ca
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1510.01210
Autor:
Cechlárová, Katarína, Eirinakis, Pavlos, Fleiner, Tamás, Magos, Dimitrios, Manlove, David, Mourtos, Ioannis, Oceláková, Eva, Rastegari, Baharak
We consider Pareto-optimal matchings (POMs) in a many-to-many market of applicants and courses where applicants have preferences, which may include ties, over individual courses and lexicographic preferences over sets of courses. Since this is the mo
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1507.02866
Several countries successfully use centralized matching schemes for school or higher education assignment, or for entry-level labour markets. In this paper we explore the computational aspects of a possible similar scheme for assigning teachers to sc
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1501.05547
Publikováno v:
Econometrica, 2019 Sep 01. 87(5), 1633-1661.
Externí odkaz:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/45217222